Call for consultancy services for field research in the field of defence procurement in the UK

Expected start date: January 2019
Deliverable due date: 31 May 2019
Fee: 6000 USD, which includes expenses and VAT, if it is applicable. Payment is to be made against invoices (1 interim payment is envisaged upon meeting milestones).
Location: UK (at least for the interviews)
Closing date for applications: 16 December 2018

Applications are invited for field research work in the “State capture and defence procurement in the EU” project funded by the Open Society Initiative for Europe at the Government Transparency Institute. The project aims at mapping the connections that drive outcomes in the European defence industry. We are

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Call for consultancy services for field research in the field of defence procurement in France

Expected start date: January 2019
Deliverable due date: 31 May 2019
Fee: 6000 USD, which includes expenses and VAT, if it is applicable. Payment is to be made against invoices (1 interim payment is envisaged upon meeting milestones).
Location: France (at least for the interviews)
Closing date for applications: 16 December 2018

Applications are invited for field research work in the “State capture and defence procurement in the EU” project funded by the Open Society Initiative for Europe at the Government Transparency Institute. The project aims at mapping the connections that drive outcomes in the European defence industry. We are

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Anti-corruption interventions in development aid: Is corruption reduced or merely displaced?

Dávid-Barrett, E., Fazekas, M. (2018): Anti-corruption interventions in development aid:
Is corruption reduced or merely displaced? GTI-WP/2018:02, Budapest: Government Transparency Institute

Most anti-corruption interventions are small-scale and targeted. Hence, there is a risk that they simply displace corruption rather than reducing it as corrupt actors adapt to the new conditions. Direct attempts at improving corruption controls in one area might elicit two evasive tactics: corrupt actors could shift focus to areas with weaker controls or could more aggressively exploit the loopholes that remain. Observing such displacement effects requires an overview of a whole system and detailed data points within it, …

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Institutional quality, campaign contributions, and favouritism in US federal government contracting

Fazekas, M., Ferrali, R., Wachs, J. (2018): Institutional quality, campaign contributions, and favouritism in US federal government contracting. GTI-WP/2018:01, Budapest: Government Transparency Institute.

The corrupting power of money in US politics has long been debated with emerging evidence pointing out that campaign contributions help funnel money to politically connected companies. However, it is yet unclear how exactly such mechanisms might work and what are the curbs on politically driven contracting. To address these gaps we compile the full dataset of published federal contracts and registered campaign contributions for 2004-2015, linked to each other on the company level. We develop corruption …

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Development aid funded contracts and projects: World Bank, IADB, and EuropeAid datasets

The project, “Curbing corruption in development aid-funded procurement” is releasing the full datasets collected on development projects, public tenders, and contracts for 3 major donor agencies: the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and EuropeAid. The project was supported by the British Academy/ UK Department for International Development Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme. The final datasets result from a concerted effort by GTI, the University of Sussex and Datlab. In addition to republishing structured data gathered from official source websites, the datasets also contain corruption risk red flags developed by the research team.

About the project

Development aid donors …

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