INSPECTORATE
OF GOVERNMENT

Study on the Costs and Extent of Corruption in the Education Sector in Uganda

December 2021

Foreword

The 4th National Integrity Survey Report 2019 and other surveys suggest not only bribery but also other forms of corruption such as absenteeism and ghost workers seriously impact the education services in Uganda. Corruption in education provision negatively affects both the quality and accessibility of education services which later reduces the opportunities of children from disadvantaged backgrounds and reinforces poverty and social inequality in the society.

Despite being a clear challenge, comprehensive upto date estimates of the extent and cost of corruption in the Education sector are lacking. By failing to measure the cost of corruption in the health sector and establishing the magnitude of the problem to Ugandans, adequate and appropriate anti-corruption measures cannot be developed.

The Inspectorate of Government (IG) in 2021, commissioned the research on the cost and extent of corruption in the Education Sector in Uganda with support from the German Government, through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmBH.The research was conducted by the Governance Transparency Institute (Hungary) which is an international and non-partisan think tank in good governance.

With the combined effort of all the laws and institutions in place the war against corruption has mainly centered on whistleblowers, tracking suspects, investigating, prosecution, conviction, incarcerate and recovery of the loot. But the fact is that only a very small percentage of corruption gets detected or even gets to the level of being investigated at all.

There is therefore need to rebrand the war from being an Executive, Parliament, Judiciary, IG, NGOs and Anti-Corruption Agencies' war with citizens of Uganda being mere frustrated spectators, to a Citizens' War.

As we release the report of extent and cost of Corruption in the Education Sector Uganda, it is my hope that relevant authorities and institutions in the sector will take the findings seriously, have further deliberations to improve on the implementation of strategies for the elimination of corruption in the Education Sector in Uganda.

I have the honour to present the report on the extent and cost of Corruption in the Education Sector to the people of Uganda and all stakeholders in the fight to eliminate corruption. I implore all stakeholders to read this report and set targets that will help deter, prevent and eliminate corruption in all public institutions.

Beti Kamya Turwomwe

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT

Government Transparency Institute

About the Authors

In 2021, the Inspectorate of Government, initiated the research on the cost of corruption in Uganda with support from the German Government, through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmBH. The Government Transparency Institute GTI) a non-partisan think tank researching and advocating good governance was contracted to conduct the study. Born from the research and Civil Society activism of its founder Mihály Fazekas, the Institute was founded in Budapest, Hungary in 2015 to provide an independent, research-driven voice to the causes of transparency, anti-corruption, and good governance in Europe and beyond. It is financed by private donations, European research funds, and government contract work, and works independently of political parties or special interest groups. The aim of the Institute is to better understand the causes, characteristics, and consequences of low-quality governance with interdisciplinary analysis, drawing on political science, economics, law, and data science.

The Institute help citizens and companies hold their governments accountable through the publication of novel datasets and robust analyses. The unique research approach uses Big Data, econometrics, and qualitative methods to understand micro-behaviour, macro-outcomes, and the links between the two. The main themes include corruption, collusion, spending efficiency, administrative quality, public procurement, and legislative processes. We believe that the combination of a thorough qualitative understanding and precise quantitative measurement of the state is the foundation of good governance.

The main authors of the report on cost of corruption were; Mihály Fazekas and Olena Nikulina (Government Transparency Institute)

Mihály Fazekas is an Assistant Professor at the Central European University, Department of Public Policy, with a focus on using Big Data methods to understand the quality of government globally. He is also the Scientific Director of an innovative think-tank, the Government Transparency Institute. He has a PhD from the University of Cambridge where he pioneered Big Data Methods to measure and understand high-level corruption in Central- and Eastern Europe. His research and policy interests revolve around corruption, favouritism, private sector collusion, and government spending efficiency. Methodologically, he has experience in both quantitative and qualitative methods in diverse fields such as public policy, economics, and political science.He worked at the University of Cambridge as the scientific coordinator of the Horizon 2020 funded project DIGIWHIST which used a Big Data approach to measuring corruption risks, administrative capacity, and transparency in public procurement in 33 European countries. While at University College London, he served as a co-Principal Investigator on the FCDO-funded research project looking at anti-corruption in development aid funded procurement.

He regularly consults the European Commission, Council of Europe, EBRD, OECD, World Bank, and a range of national governments and NGOs across the globe. He led a team of FCDO UK, GTI, and IMF which won the 1st prize at the IMF Anti-Corruption Challenge for measuring corruption and its costs globally.

Olena Nikulina is a Data Scientist at GTI. She holds a MA degree in Sociology (Kyiv-Mohyla Academy) and Public Policy (Central European University). Previously, she worked as a data journalist and an analyst in NGOs in Ukraine. Along with that, she consulted governmental agencies in Ukraine on data collection and analysis. She is interested in working with open data and large governmental data for studying political corruption. GTI also received advice from the expert pool: Dina Balabanova (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine), Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett (University of Sussex), Eleanor Hutchinson (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) Monica Kirya (CMI-U4), and Caryn Peiffer (University of Bristol) while compiling the report.

GTI also worked with Dr. Daniel Kibuuka Musoke, International Research Consortium and Dr. Dan Kaggwa Ssenjovu, Infectious Disease Institute Makerere University who conducted the National Survey on the extent and Cost of Corruption in the Education Sector and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, a Political Scientist with special interest in Political Economy together with Agather Atuhaire undertook the qualitative research interviews and Focus Group Discussions on the extent and cost of corruption in the Education Sector in Uganda.

The findings and analysis in this report is attributed to the authors and by no means constitute the views of the Inspectorate of Government of Uganda or the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRI	Corruption Risk Indicator
EUR	European Currency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Gesellschaft Fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IG	Inspectorate of Government
MOFPED	Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIS	National Integrity Survey
NMS	National Medical Stores
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PTA	Parent Teachers Association
SMC	School Management Committees
UGX	Uganda Shillings
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USD	United States Dollar

Executive Summary

Introduction:

The Inspectorate of Government in 2021, initiated the study on the cost and extent of Corruption in the Education Sector in Uganda with support from the German Government, through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmBH. The study was conducted by the Governance Transparency Institute (Hungary) an international and non-partisan think tank Organization in good governance. The study was undertaken using available data and included few interviews with experts, practitioners and relevant public officials from Uganda and beyond. The International Research Consortium Ltd, headed by Dr Daniel Kibuuka Musoke undertook a national survey and a team led by Frederick Golooba-Mutebi conducted the qualitative information.

The overall objective of the study was to generate empirical data on the cost and extent of corruption in the Education Sector Uganda that can be used for dialogue with stakeholders to inform anti-corruption policy formulation, strategies, and programs in the sector. The baseline study shall provide a basis to understand and measure if an enhanced focus to curb corruption in the Education sector will have a positive impact over an extended period. The study will help to identify why citizens pay bribes to get services, but also why the workers and staff in the Education sector asks for bribes.

This report provides a detailed overview of the extent and costs of corruption in the education sector in Uganda. The study covers costs occurring due the various types of corruption in the sector, such as bribery, absenteeism, corruption in public procurement. Along with that, the study offers estimates of corruption costs for different groups of cost bearers – users of education services (families with children of school age), public budget, and society at large.

The cost of corruption estimates are based on a variety of methods and data sources: a household survey and qualitative data gathered through in-depth interviews with experts and practitioners in the sector, as well government administrative data, secondary survey data, and the topical literature. Overall, our estimates should be considered as a lower bound estimate of the true cost of corruption given that some costs are in-kind while others are non-measurable due to lack of data.

Findings:

Payment of Bribes: First, costs occur due to users (students and their families) having to bribe an education provider (teacher, school officials, examiner etc.) for the delivery of a service that should be delivered free of charge or for an official fee. This cost especially threatens low income households and may serve as a barrier to access to education. Using bribery prevalence and average bribe size estimates from our household survey, we estimate the cost of UGX 39.1 billion.

Absenteeism: The next two costs are related to teacher absenteeism. Firstly, undue absence of teachers from work is costly for the public budget in terms of "wasted" salaries. The estimated annual cost for the public budget amounts to UGX 180.5 billion in 2019. Accordingly, teacher's absenteeism decreases both quantity and quality of learning for students. While the available data does not allow us to develop a comprehensive estimate for loss of learning due to absenteeism, we found that the cost of education hours was about UGX 1.5 trillion.

Embezzlement of funds: As public officials steal or divert funds or supplies intended for public education, the school and therewith the students ultimately receive less. We quantify the annual loss of public education funds of UGX 244.6 billion.

Additionally, this form of corruption bears non-measurable in-kind costs for students in terms of loss of education quality.

This report also discussed several costs that we were not able to precisely estimate due to lack of the relevant data and literature. These are:

1) costs to physical and mental wellbeing of students due to abuse and sextortion,

2) costs of corruption in procurement of school infrastructure and inputs,

3) loss of education quality for students due to corruption,

4) loss of income/earning potential due to lower quality and attainment,

5) lost productivity and economic growth due to low quality of corruption,

6) costs of positive attitudes towards corruption among students gained through observing corruption in the school system.

Irregular employment of unqualified teachers: Based on the data from qualitative estimates, the study discusses corruption in teachers' employment that results in both lower quality of education, and costs for the public budget in terms of wages paid to unqualified teachers. The forms of corruption in employment include forgery of documents about qualifications, bribery in hiring and allocation of transfers, favouritism and nepotism.

Finally, the study found a number of other forms of corruption based on the qualitative study: bribery in monitoring of schools, and activities of School Management Committees, as well as the practice of teachers using school resources for private benefit.

The report suggests that the elimination of corruption in the education sec-tor of Uganda could result in substantial annual savings of nearly UGX 1.8 trillion. This is equal to 51% of annual government spending on the sector in 2019. The larg-est measurable corruption costs are attributed to teachers' absenteeism leading to the loss of instructional time for students. Along with that, substantial savings up to UGX 39.1 billion can be achieved through elimination of bribery in the sector.

Chapter One:

Introduction

1.1 Background

There is broad consensus that Uganda faces considerable challenges related to corruption. According to the Fourth National Integrity Survey Report[1] not only bribery but also other forms of corruption such as absenteeism and ghost workers seriously impact public service delivery. This constrains citizens' access to vital services such as education, affecting individual life chances and social development. Corruption erodes trust in the education system among citizens - one third of citizens think that malpractices and dishonesty are common in public schools[2]. Worse still, corruption in schools 'normalizes' unethical behaviour and makes it socially acceptable at an early age.[3]

Every year for several decades, 180 countries participate in what is known as the World Corruption Perception Index in which countries are scored and ranked against each other depending on the perceived prevalence of corruption in the country. The score and ranking of Uganda in the recent years has been poor. The score in 2019 was 28 out of 100 while in 2020 it was 27 out of 100 and the ranking was 137 out of 180 in 2019 and 142 out of 180 in 2020.

Despite being a clear challenge to the Uganda's sustainable development, comprehensive estimates of the extent and cost of corruption in the Education Sector are lacking. With support from the German Government, through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmBH, the IG commissioned a study to the estimate the cost of corruption in the education sector in Uganda.

1.2 Objectives the study

Despite being a clear challenge to the country's sustainable development, comprehensive estimates of the extent and cost of corruption in the education sector are lacking. This research informs the debate and provides an evidence base to underpin advocacy for the reforms to policies and institutions that are needed to reduce corruption in the education sector. The research also provides more detailed and precise evidence about the conditions driving corruption, such as the reasons why bribes are paid and requested, and as such can enhance stakeholder dialogue and government accountability to citizens, as well as helping institutions to assess the impact of targeted anti-corruption measures and think about how to adapt them to improve efficacy. To this end, the report offers an estimate of the prevalence and costs of corruption in education provision in Uganda, as well as a discussion of the drivers and mechanisms behind corruption in the sector.

1 IGG National Integrity Survey 2020

2 Ibid., p. 81

3 Transparency International, 2013. Global Corruption Report: Education, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2013_GCR_Education_EN.pdf , p.xx

1.3 Overview of education system of Uganda

Education service delivery is mostly undertaken by local governments in line with the Decentralization Policy. Local governments provide frontline services in the implementation of education policies and programs. Education service providers include the Government (public) schools as well as private schools. The latter include community-founded schools, schools owned by entrepreneurs,

faith-based schools and schools owned by NGOs. 64% of primary schools are government-owned, while36% are privately owned. 38% of secondary schools are government owned, while 62% are private[4]. The extent of liberalization in the sector has several implications for corruption and anti-corruption as it means that a substantial part of service delivery is not controlled by the government and therefore needs adequate regulation. This would in turn require increased resource allocation, which is difficult in a low-income country like Uganda.

Between 2012/13 and 2016/17, budget allocations to the sector have decreased as a proportion of the National Budget, from 14.7% to 11.08 %. However, in relative terms, the absolute amount allocated to the sector increased by an annual average of UGX 243 billion, which amounts to an increase of 86% over that period. The biggest share of the budget – about 62.5% - goes to wages[5]. Yet, Uganda's high population growth rate (3%), with a corresponding increase of 37% in the number of children reaching school-going age makes it difficult for the government to keep up with demand. This makes it all the more important to safeguard resources from theft and leakage through corrupt practices.

4 Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education and Sports Sector Sector Strategic Plan 2017/2018 – 2019/2020, https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/document/file/2020-7-Uganda-ESP.pdf, pp. 2-3

5 Ibid, p.4

Chapter Two:

Conceptual framework

2.1 Definitions: Typology of corruption

One of the most commonly used definitions of corruption is: "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain". Leading international anti-corruption institutions such as Transparency International employ this definition[6]. This definition looks at corruption within a bureaucratic context where the roles and responsibilities of public officials are set out, such that it is possible to identify what constitutes misuse or abuse of public office.

Corruption can occur at different levels. Ordinary people are most likely to confront 'low-level' bribery of fairly junior public officials who perform fairly routine tasks to issue licences or permits, for example - in other words, petty corruption. Such service-level or grassroots corruption often refers to street-level bureaucrats employing corrupt practices as they deliver essential public services. This may typically involve citizens making informal payments or giving small favors or gifts to public officials, with bribery being the most common form of corruption (Bardhan, 2006; Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel, 2014).

At the other end of the scale, high-level, grand corruption usually involves abuses of senior roles within government institutions to benefit the few at the expense of the many, and may cause serious, widespread and long-term harm to individuals and society[7]. Grand corruption is perpetrated by corrupt leaders who typically abuse their control of state institutions to expropriate the state's wealth with impunity. Grand corruption is inherently difficult to fight since its perpetrators design and control the system in which they operate.

The Uganda Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 defines nine different types of corrupt acts that can be committed by public officials, including: the direct or indirect solicitation or acceptance as well as the offering or granting of any monetary goods, benefits, or any other form of gratification for himself or another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions; the diversion or private use of any property, monies or securities belonging to the State; the direct or indirect offering or giving, promising, solicitation or acceptance of any undue advantage to or by any private sector representative or promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in the public or private sector; the fraudulent acquisition, use or concealment of property derived from any of the acts referred to in this section; the participation of any kind and manner to commit any of the acts referred to above; any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public official for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself or for a third party; or neglect of duty (Uganda Anti-Corruption Act, 2009 - shortened version of Article 2)[8]. All of these corruption forms appear in the education sector.

As both the international as well as the Ugandan definition show, the act of corruption is commonly understood as an interaction between different actors where a transaction involving the exchange

6 https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption

7 https://www.unodc.org/documents/NGO/Grand_Corruption_definition_with_explanation_19_August_2016_002_1.pdf and https://www.transparency.org/en/corruptionary/grand-corruption

8 https://www.ulrc.go.ug/system/files_force/ulrc_resources/anti-corruption-act-2009.pdf?download=1

of funds and/or favours takes place. However, there can also be non-transactional misconduct carried out by individuals which represents an abuse of entrusted power and results in private gain, such as "shirking" (Gates, Scott & John Brehm, 1997), sabotage, embezzlement, fraud, absenteeism

("neglect of duty"), and payment of "ghost workers". We include these types of misconduct to provide a comprehensive picture of the ways that entrusted power is abused for private gain in the education sector.

2.2 Corrupt practices in Public Education

In many countries, corruption is pervasive at all levels of the education system, from primary schools through to secondary and tertiary institutions. Corruption in education can occur at any stage and among any group of actors, from policy makers at the ministerial level to providers at the school level such as teachers. It may also involve contractors as well as beneficiaries of education such as students and parents. These groups can be involved in corruption in several ways, as shown in Table 2 below.

An additional harmful corrupt practice that is prevalent in Uganda is so-called "sextortion" or "sex for grades" – sexual harassment and extortion carried out by teachers in exchange for educational favours such good grades or passing a test. According to UNICEF[9], sexual abuse is a significant problem in schools in Uganda. Corruption also hinders the process of reporting, investigating, and punishment of abuses of power in education (Mieszczański, 2018).

Table 2 sums up the variety of corrupt practices in public education.

Table 2. Corrupt practices in public education

- Policy-making (e.g. misallocation of budgets, capture of school grants)
- Procurement (e.g. building contracts)
- Teachers (e.g. recruitment)
- Finance and control (e.g. leakage of budgets)
- Examination boards (e.g. selling of exam papers)
- At schools (e.g. bribes and illegal fees for admission and examination, teacher absenteeism, sexual extortion of students)

2.3 Corruption Drivers

There are many ways of explaining why corruption occurs, which we outline below. Note that these also imply different approaches for tackling corruption.

9https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5614036de4b0014b6b21ce4f/t/57473aae40261de8e3aea696/1464285877619/Child+Protection%2C+Safety+%26+Security+in+Uganda+Schools.pdf

2.3.1 Corruption as a Principal-Agent problem

In this framework, corruption is conceptualized as a principal-agent problem, wherein citizens are seen as "principals", and teachers and public officials are cast as "agents". Teachers and officials are recognised as possessing discretion on the distribution of education-based resources, and citizens are unable to perfectly monitor their decisions and related actions. This dynamic potentially allows room for corruption. Consequently, strategies to fightcorruption commonly focus on decreasing the discretionary power of agents (teachers and public officials working in the sector) and establishing better oversight and accountability mechanisms (Klitgaard, 1988).

The underlying driver of corruption in the sector is that education credentials embody the hopes of families and students for a better future. Thus, education is a high stakes endeavour, especially in developing economies where scarcity of education services adds to the problem. This scarcity and importance of education create strong incentives for corruption in the sector for both sides of principals and agents[10].

2.3.2 Corruption as a collective action problem and particularism

Corruption is also conceptualised as a collective action problem, and this conceptualization captures the fact that many different groups of actors in government, civil society and the private sector can fail to coordinate an effective anti-corruption response. An effective anticorruption response may not be in the best interest of those actors that have influence over the sector. In addition, the costs of effectively coordinating an effective response to corruption may be too high (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). Seen this way, the collective action problem of controlling corruption facilitates systemic corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2018).

In the education sector, corruption can be driven by the failure of different actors to coordinate and control the complexity and spread of corrupt practices through the country education institutions. Furthermore, private providers offer a substantial part of education services in Uganda. Low government investment into public schools make private education more and more popular among families who can afford it; however, the growing private sector in the education system is not complemented by regulations and monitoring for private schools[11], creating incentives for corruption. Moreover, momentum for improving education quality is lost because many parents with the knowledge, influence and means to create pressure for change have opted for private schools and are not concerned with improving the public education system[12].

Many societies are characterized by particularism, meaning that people's treatment by the state depends on their position in society. Therefore, corruption in particularistic societies essentially reproduces the existing structures of inequality and uneven distribution of power (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). Strategies to fight this type of corruption are thought to require a more comprehensive approach that focuses on fostering anti-corruption norms and building coalitions against corruption – for example, by educating people or creating tools fostering collective action and coordination.

10 OECD (2018), Integrity of Education Systems: A Methodology for Sector Assessment, https://www.oecd. org/corruption/acn/OECD-ACN-Integrity-of-Education-Systems-ENG.pdf

11 https://www.iser-uganda.org/images/downloads/privatisation_discrimination_and_right_to_education.pdf, p. 20-21

12 Kjær and Nansozi, Inclusion as political mobilisation: The political economy of quality education initiatives in Uganda, ESID Working paper no. 65, at https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_65_kjaer_muwanga.pdf

2.3.3 Corruption as a problem-solving functionality

Corruption can be understood through the functions it fulfils, in other words "the ways in which corruption provides solutions to the everyday problems people face, particularly in resource-scarce environments, problems that often have deep social, structural, economic and political roots" (Marquette & Peiffer, 2021, 2018). This understanding of corruption relates to the idea that corruption is a necessity for many people to fix daily problems. For instance, underpaid teachers might be absent from their workplaces to get additional earnings[13]. There can also be system failures that lead to corrupt practices - for example, one interviewee mentioned that understaffing forces some schools to hire staff illegally to fill gaps and be able to continue to provide services (Interview 3, Head of an anti-corruption organisation).

With that, it is important to acknowledge that, for individuals or groups, using corruption for solving problems requires strong informal networks. When informal networks are weak, corruption cannot provide solutions. Accordingly, problem solving functionality of corruption is not accessible for individuals and groups with weak informal networks or outside of such networks (e.g., marginalized groups).

The corruption functionality approach helps to explain why corruption persists. It argues that people believe they must rely on corruption (be it small-scale bribery or grand corruption) to solve the social, economic or political problems they face. Strategies to fight corruption following this approach focus on better understanding which functions corruption fulfils so as to craft appropriate anti-corruption efforts. Through this lens, corruption is seen as a logical mechanism which arises to solve problems that are associated with the brokenness of the system– a symptom of weak governance, rather than a cause of it.

This approach also highlights that tackling corruption can have unintended consequences or "costs" that may leave people even more vulnerable. Reducing corruption, without fixing the broken system, can potentially result in more harm than good, because it could take away a mechanism people relied upon to navigate the broken system and solve immediate problems they face (Peiffer, Armytage, Marquette & Gumisiriza, 2020). To reduce corruption, from the functionality perspective, it is necessary to address the underlying problems that corruption solves (such as improving access to scarce resources or navigating a security issue) rather than addressing corruption directly.

2.4 Costs of Corruption

Corruption in the public education sector can impose costs in numerous ways. In order to cover the various forms of cost impacts that corruption can take, we differentiate between direct costs and indirect costs which may be monetizable or non-monetizable. The costs are separated according to the actors bearing the costs, namely 1) public budgets including the Ugandan government but also international donors, 2) public service users and citizens, and 3) the society at large.Direct costs include all those costs that can be directly attributed to corrupt acts. This can be either a direct cost to the public budget (hence in our case to the Ugandan government or donor governments providing aid to the Ugandan budget); or a direct cost to the citizens who are required to pay a bribe to get a public service. In the latter case, the cost involves a transfer of money from citizens to public officials, thus the cost to the former constitutes an (approximately) equal income to the latter which would make the net cost to society zero. While it is important to keep in mind that there are incomes from corruption in case of transfers such as bribes, in this case, we measure the total direct cost of corruption to the service user or citizen.Indirect costs include all those that are only indirectly attributable to the corrupt act and harder to express in exact monetary terms. Indirect costs constitute a dead-weight loss to society, in other words they do not benefit anyone but create a deviation from the optimal resource allocation of the public budget and more broadly impact the whole economy. Hence, they represent the net social cost.In sum, we have three types of costs incurred by different groups:Cost to the public budget (direct

13 http://ti-health.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IgnoredPandemic-WEB-v3.pdf, p. 5-6

cost)Cost to citizens (direct cost)Net social cost due to dead-weight loss (indirect cost)

Table 3. Overview of types of corruption in public education

Type of corruption		Cost category		Cost description	Cost bearing actor	Estimation methods
Level	*Nature*	*Cost type*	*Cost form*			
Low-level	Transactional	Direct	Financial	Cost of bribing teacher/ examiner	Citizen	literature and policy document review, government statistics, survey, interviews
Low-level	Non-transactional (absenteeism)	Direct	Financial	Loss to the public budget due to absenteeism in public schools	Public budget	literature and policy document review, government budget data, survey, interviews
Low-level	Non-transactional (absenteeism)	Direct	In-kind	Loss of education hours to student due to absenteeism	Citizen	literature and policy document review, survey
Low-level	Non-transactional (embezzlement)	Direct	Financial	Loss of public education funds through embezzlement	Public budget	literature and policy document review, government budget data, interviews
High-level	Non-transactional (embezzlement)	Direct	Financial	Loss to the public budget due to education procurement corruption	Public budget	literature and policy document review, government procurement data, interviews
Low-level	Non-transactional	Indirect	In-kind	Cost to physical and mental well-being of students	Citizen	literature and policy document review, survey, interviews
Low-level	Non-transactional (embezzlement)	Direct	In-kind	Loss of education quality for users	Citizen	literature and policy document review, survey, interviews
High-level	Non-transactional	Indirect	Financial	Potential loss of income due to lost education/low quality education	Citizen	literature and policy document review, government statistics
High-level	Non-transactional	Indirect	In-kind	Lost productivity and GDP due to low quality of education	Society at large	literature and policy document review, government statistics

Chapter Three:

Methods and Data

3.1 Focus of the Analysis

Corruption in the provision of public services, in particular in education provision, can impose costs in numerous ways. This report focuses on the types of corruption in public education and classifies them according to the following characteristics:

- Level at which **corruption occurs**: lower or higher office.
- **Nature of corruption**: transactional or non-transactional.
- **Type of cost**: direct or indirect.
- **Form of cost**: financial or in-kind.
- **Individual or group bearing the costs:** citizens, public budget, society at large.

The forms of corruption are distinguished as presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Low-level vs. high-level corruption

Low-level corruption	High-level corruption
• transactional: bribery (including extortion) • non-transactional corruption by individuals or organisations: embezzlement, fraud, absenteeism, ghost workers	grand / institutional corruption (usually transactional, but can also involve embezzlement)

This report utilizes a mixed-methods approach to achieve comprehensive as possible the measurement of low- and high-level incidences of corruption, given data constraints.

The scope of the study covered available data in 2019 and also included interviews with experts, practitioners and relevant public officials from Uganda and beyond. A national survey on the extent and cost of corruption in Education Sector in Uganda and the qualitative information was conducted from February to December 2021 using research interviews and focus group discussions.

3.2 Administrative data

3.2.2 Government administrative data

Building on the records of the IG and access to government documents, the study combined primary datasets with government administrative data wherever possible. This allowed the authors to refine and validate the estimates of types of corruption and costs specific to the machinery of the Ugandan government, e.g., in the case of absenteeism in the education sector.

3.2.3 Red flag methodology to analyse procurement data

The dataset was compiled using national spending which includes sectoral procurement data on education and identification of corruption risks and estimate of the costs of these risks. The dataset contains 50,000 contracts covering the years 2015-2020; it was obtained from the government's open data portal[14] in prior research and updated for this analysis.

Corruption proxies measurable in procurement data were used to analyse the public spending structure, the prices paid for procurement, and the quality of delivery (in terms of cost overrun after contract award). The details of the red flag methodology are explained in Annex A. The estimation of the costs of corruption risks in procurement builds on

and extends our award-winning Corruption Risk Tracker methodology[15] (winner of the IMF Anti-Corruption Challenge in 2020) and covers almost all procurement spending, which amounts to about 10% of annual Ugandan GDP[16].

3.2.4 Review of literature and Policy Documents

The study used systematised and reviewed the existing literature, corruption analyses and previously collected data. This guided the research design and supported the data collection and analysis but also filled in crucial gaps. For example, there is a large body of literature discussing drivers of absenteeism among teachers in Uganda (see, for example, Okurut, 2012; Komakech & Osuu, 2014; Ocak et al, 2017).

Additionally, the survey used secondary data collected from existing surveys including Afrobarometer (2018), East Africa Bribery Index (2017), National Integrity Survey (2020), 2012 and 2013 Corruption Trends Report using the Data Tracking Mechanism.

3.2.5 Interviews

The research team conducted 37 in-depth semi-structured interviews with the sectoral experts, practitioners, relevant public officials, and parents. The interviews were used to collect evidence about the mechanisms through which different types of corruption occur, to guide our quantitative analysis of the extent of corruption and its costs, and to help contextualise and interpret our findings. Qualitative research identified different forms of corruption and their costs where a direct quantitative measurement is not feasible.

Qualitative research is intended not to provide evidence about the prevalence of corruption but rather to reveal the range of corrupt practices occurring and to discern how individuals

14 https://gpp.ppda.go.ug/#/public/open-data/

15 http://www.govtransparency.eu/index.php/2020/10/08/the-imf-anti-corruption-challenge/

16 https://ti-health.org/content/modelling-reform-strategies-for-open-contracting-in-low-and-middle-income-countries/

relate corruption to various potential drivers. The interviews were designed as in-depth semi-structured conversations of at least 60 minutes using a question guide with open-ended questions that allow for follow-up and deviation depending on the interviewees' expertise while ensuring that the same key topics are covered in all interviews. Interviews were analysed in phases, first by identifying key types of corruption and associated narratives, and then in a second phase by coding for the different explanatory approaches outlined above.

3.2.6 Household survey

To estimate the prevalence and cost of corruption at the point of service delivery, we designed and conducted a nationally representative face-to-face, household level survey. The sample for the survey consisted of 1600 respondents. We used the Uganda Population and Housing Census 2014 as the sampling frame. A more detailed description of the survey methodology is provided in Annex C.

To identify the respondents considered as users of education services, the study team used a screening question at the beginning of each interview - whether there is at least one child of school age in a household. If a respondent's answer was "yes" – they were asked about their experiences of corruption in the education sector. The sub-sample of households with children of school age included 68% of the total sample.

In cases where a household included a child of school age who does not attend school, the survey sought to find out why this was the case (e.g. not being able to afford to make a payment). Furthermore, if a household preferred a private school, the survey asked for reasons for not attending a public school. The inclusion of respondents that did not use education services or avoided public institutions was crucial to accurately estimate the costs of non-provision of services due to corruption.

Given the school closures in Uganda due to COVID-19 in 2019-2020, the respondents were asked about experiences of corruption in schools that had happened within 12 months before the COVID-19 lockdown[17].

17 This aspect posed certain challenges for the survey and validity of responses. Asking about experiences of corruption in schools that had happened 12 months before the COVID-19 lockdown could lead to recall bias in the responses. This happens when respondents cannot remember past events accurately. However, this has been offset by the fact that data has been triangulated through literature review and interviews.

Chapter Four:

Study Findings

According to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the fulfilment of the human right for education relies on the four interrelated features of education systems: availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. The feature of availability means that the number of education institutions in the country is sufficient to meet a demand for education. Accessibility anticipates that everyone can participate in education regardless of his or her socio-economic or other background. Acceptability stands for the expectation that content and teaching are acceptable for students in terms of cultural appropriateness, quality, and other dimensions. Finally, adaptability means that it stays relevant for students with respect to changing social and cultural circumstances. Corruption in education undermines each of these features, thus, restricting people from fulfilling their right for education. In this section, we will explore the costs that corruption in the education sector imposes for the state, society at large, and citizens in detail.

4.1 Costs arising from the payment of bribes or provision of gifts to education providers

The first direct, transactional type cost for education users (pupils/students/parents) relates to bribing an education provider (teacher, examiner etc.) for the delivery of a service that should be delivered free of charge or for a fixed lower fee, or to receive (better) results. In many cultures, there is no clear distinction between a bribe and a gift, including in Uganda (Gaal and McKee, 2005). The National Integrity Survey Report 2020 shows that at public education institutions, 72% of survey respondents paid for services, but most of this covered official fees. Only 4.5% of those surveyed paid an extra amount demanded and only 8% of those additional payments were “unofficial” fees. The cost of corruption here equals the amount of the bribe paid and is a cost inflicted on the individual citizen.

4.1.1 Briber y patterns

7% of all respondents in the household survey reported that, within the 12 months prior to COVID-19 lockdown, they or someone from their household had been asked to pay a bribe, give a gift, pay extra money (but not an official fee) or do a favour for a teacher or school official to access some type of service for the household’s the oldest child. In our sample, bribery appears to be more prevalent at the primary level - 5% of households with the oldest child in primary school had been asked to pay a bribe, give a gift or a service. In addition, survey findings suggest a slightly higher bribery rate in rural areas - 4% compared to urban areas - 3%.

Our bribery rate estimate is compatible with the existing survey evidence. In particular, the East Africa Bribery Index (2017) estimates the prevalence of bribery in public education in Uganda to be around 6%. Naturally, for those households sampled that reported having a child of school age, a higher percentage – 9% - report being asked to pay a bribe. Among those who had paid bribes, 64% had made the payment to a teacher, 30% to a school official and 6% to someone else in the sector.

91% of the sample of those approached to pay a bribe say they gave money, while 9% gave food or drink. Meanwhile, 14% of households that paid a bribe reported that it was an "appreciation payment". Excluding the respondents who regarded their payment as appreciation results in a bribery rate of 6%.

The median size of the bribe reported by the respondents was UGX 21,000. Extrapolating these bribery rates and amounts estimates to the whole population of Uganda and adjusting it to the 2019

value of the UGX, this results in a total estimated cost for citizens of bribery in education amounting to UGX 39.1 billion or EUR 9.1 million.

4.1.2 Motivation for bribes

Survey evidence allows us to break down the motivations for bribe-paying in public education (Figure 1). 30% of respondents who report paying a bribe in respect of their eldest child's education during the 12 months before COVID lockdown, did so in order to ensure good grades for their children, and 26% to secure a place for their child in a school. 10% paid a bribe to ensure that they passed a test or an exam, while 14% said that they had paid a bribe as an "appreciation payment".

Figure 1: Motivation to bribe



% indicating motivations for bribe payment, amongst sample of those that report paying a bribe in 12 months before COVID lockdown for oldest child.

Note: Respondents could choose more than one motivation.

The median value of bribes paid differed somewhat by expressed motivation for bribery, as well. Among households that paid bribes in the last 6 months, UGX 20,000 was the median value of a bribe for those who sought to secure a place for their child and for those that sought to ensure good grades for their child. UGX 15,000, in contrast, was the median value of a bribe for those that sought to ensure their child passed a test or exam, and for those

seeking to express their appreciation through payment.

4.1.3 Consequences of not paying a bribe

The study further investigated respondents' expectations about the consequences of not paying a bribe (Figure 2). Only one-fifth of those who answered a question on expected consequences thought there would be no consequences.

By contrast, around 28% believed that not paying a bribe would lead to their child being refused a place in a school or being sent away from school. 21% of respondents said that they thought their child would receive a worse mark and a further one-fifth thought that their child would fail a test because of not paying the bribe.

Figure 2: Expected consequences of not paying a bribe



Note: Respondents could choose more than one expected consequence.

4.1.4 Financial strain on household from bribery

The household survey also investigated the financial strain on households arising from the need to pay bribes, finding that bribes were by and large seen as affordable. 5% of households with children of school-going age report having to cut other expenses in order to pay a bribe for education related services, while 4% of households with children of school-going age report that they had to borrow money to afford an education-related bribe. 3% of households with children of school-going age reported that they were unable or refused to pay a bribe for education for their oldest child during the 12 months before the COVID lockdown.

4.1.5 Factors associated with bribery

Using a logistic regression based on survey findings, the study examined what factors are most significantly associated with being a part of a household that has received a request for an education-related bribe in the 12 months prior to the COVID-19 lock-down. This analysis therefore points to patterns of disproportionate vulnerability amongst the population for education related bribery.
Figure 3 (below) summarizes our findings (full logistic regression findings are found in Annex B).



Note: *Results are derived from a logistic regression and related post analyses. Shifts in predicted probability are displayed for those variables that were found to be statistically significant (p-value <0.05) association with requests for bribery. Other variables included in the analyses: age, gender, and Central regional residency; Northern regional residency was treated as the baseline for the analyses.*

Poverty is estimated to have a strong association with requests for education-related bribes. Compared to households that have not gone without food, income, cash, or electricity in the last year, Figure 3 shows that being a part of a household which has gone without these necessities frequently is associated with a sizable 12 percentage point greater probability of being approached for an education-related bribe. This worrying findingisconsistentwithacademic literature that consistently shows that the poor in Africa are disproportionately vulnerable to health and education sector bribery (e.g. Peiffer & Rose, 2018; Justesen & Bjornskov,2012,2014;KankeuandVentelou,2016).

Intuitively, the analysis also shows that large households – which are more likely to have school aged children – are more vulnerable to requests for education related bribes. Households containing more than 10 people are estimated to have a 10 percentage point greater probability of being approached for an education related bribe than those containing only 2.Agender,in contrast,werenot significantly associated with education bribery requests. In the case of gender, this is somewhat surprising, given that many women take oncare-takingrolesandthatbeingawomanhasbeenfoundby other sto be significantly associated with bribery patterns in the education sector (Peiffer & Rose, 2018).

Finally, location seems to also matter. Urbanites have a 2 percentage point less estimated probability of being approached to pay an education-related bribe than rural residents. Residents in the Eastern region were estimated to have a 12 percentage point greater probability, compared to residents of the Northern Region, of being approached for an education related bribe.

Residents in the Western Region were estimated to have a 6 percentage point greater probability, compared to residents of the Northern Region of being approached for an education-related bribe. In contrast, residents of the Central Region were not significantly different from Northern Region residents in their vulnerability to education-related bribery requests.

4.2 Loss to the budget due to absenteeism, ghost workers or abuse of recruitment

Absenteeism in the education sector in Uganda is among the highest in Africa. A World Bank report "The Global Corruption Report: Education"[18] suggests that the rate of teacher absenteeism is around 27%. The 2014 and 2012 Corruption Trends using the Data Tracking Mechanism Report found that for every 100 teachers only 39 were actually in class teaching during their assigned lessons. This absenteeism represents a cost to the public budget in terms of wages paid to absent teachers.

Topical studies[19] and our qualitative research suggests that high rates of teacher absenteeism are driven by lack of monitoring and oversight of teachers, but also by the unsatisfactory working conditions. Insufficient and delayed salaries of teachers in both private and public schools compound the problem further. To support a basic livelihood, educators often have to search for work opportunities outside their school. Furthermore, multiple respondents mentioned that due to low earnings, teachers often take loans that further worsen their economic situation. As one interviewee told us:

"[Some teachers] have personal problems like multiple loans because they are earning very little. So they resort to going into other activities like operating bodaboda (motorcycle taxis) to make some extra income. Others work in people's gardens for a daily wage." (Interview 53, Headteacher of a primary school).

Drawing on the findings from the household survey, 24% of households with school-aged children report that a child from their household missed a lesson in the 12 months prior to COVID lockdown, because their teacher was absent. It is important to acknowledge that this estimate could be an underestimation, as it does not account for cases of organized absenteeism - teachers covering undue absence of their colleagues. Figure 4 shows that over one-quarter of these households reported that they had experienced this at least once or twice per week (with 7% reporting experiencing it more than twice per week). Just over half reported that they had experienced this at least once or twice per month (with 30% reporting experiencing it more than twice per month). 10% experienced it several times per year and 9% experienced it once or twice per year.

Applying the World Bank's estimate of the absenteeism rate in Uganda (27%) to the budget expenditure data (teaching staff salaries take around 60% of local governments expenditure on public education[20]), the estimated cost of absenteeism in public education was UGX 180.5 billion or EUR 42.24 million in 2019 alone. However, the cost to children in terms of the disruption to their education, while difficult to estimate, is likely to be considerable, especially considering that over a fifth (22%) of households with children in the survey sample report missed lessons because of absenteeism at least several times per year.

4.3 Factors associated with experienced absenteeism

Using a logistic regression based on survey findings, the study examined what factors are most significantly associated with experiencing a loss of education due to absenteeism in the 12 months prior to a COVID-19 lockdown. This analysis points to patterns of disproportionate vulnerability amongst the population for losing out on lessons due to absent teachers. Figure 5 summarises the main findings from that analysis by displaying the estimated change in probability of having a child that has missed a lesson due to absenteeism, associated with

18 https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/global_corruption_report_-_educatio

19 See, for example: 2014 and 2012 IG report on Tracking Corruption, UNICEF Report "Time to Teach".

20 Based on the public funding expenditure data, 2013-2014. http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/uganda_nea_report-2016-en.pdf, pp. 84-88.

a change in value of the variables that were found to be significantly associated with that experience (full logistic regression findings are found in Annex B).



Note: Results are derived from a logistic regression and related post analyses. Shifts in predicted probability are displayed for those variables that were found to be statistically significant (p-value <0.05) association with experiencing absenteeism. Shift calculated for children in a household is from having 1 child to having 8. Other variables included in the analyses: gender, age, urbanisation; Northern regional residency was treated as the baseline for the analyses.

Poverty is once again estimated to have a strong association with experienced absenteeism. Compared to households that have not gone without food, income, cash, or electricity in the last year, Figure 5 shows that being a part of a household which has gone without these necessities frequently is associated with a sizable 14 percentage point greater probability of experiencing education-related absenteeism. Taken together with the findings shown in Figure 3, this suggests that poorer families are not only more likely to be asked to pay a bribe for education, but their children are also more likely to miss out on education because of absenteeism amongst teachers.

Having more children in the household increases the odds of experiencing education-related absenteeism. Households containing 8 children are estimated to have a 26 percentage point greater probability of experiencing education related absenteeism, compared to those households that have only 1 child. Age and gender of the respondent, in contrast, are not significantly associated with experienced education related absenteeism.

Finally, while rural dwellers are not found to be more vulnerable to experiencing education-related absenteeism, large regional differences were uncovered. Residents in the Northern Region were estimated to be far more likely to experience education related absenteeism. Residents in the Eastern Region were estimated to have a 9 percentage point lesser probability, compared to residents of the Northern Region, and residents in the Western Region were estimated to have a 13 percentage point lesser probability, compared to residents of the Northern Region, of experiencing education-related absenteeism. In contrast, residents of the Central Region have a sizable 20 percentage point lesser probability, compared to Northern Region residents, of experiencing education-related absenteeism.

4.3.1 Loss of learning due to absenteeism

Along with the costs for the public budget, teachers absenteeism results in the loss of learning. Large bodyof evidence[21] shows that the loss of instructional time leads to multiple negative consequences for students, such as academic outcomes and socialization. While the study was not able to identify available research that precisely measures the impact of absenteeism on students' academic performance in Uganda, studies from other contexts suggest that even short-term teachers' absence can lead to losses of 3.3% of standard deviation in math achievement (Miller at al., 2008). Organized absenteeism, when teachers coordinate absence and cover up for missing colleagues, is also harmful for students' achievements. Herrmann and Rockoff (2012) found that substitute teachers perform worse in facilitating learning compared to regular teachers.

The learning process also suffers from presenteeism - a situation when a teacher is present in the classroom but she or he does not perform teaching activities as they should. As one interviewee mentioned:

"Even when teachers report for work, they do not always teach. Nor do they prepare lesson plans or schemes of work." (Interview 61, Chairman LC5)

Moreover, teachers' absence and low engagement in their duties contributes to students' absenteeism in Uganda, further hindering learning outcomes[22]. The average truancy rate in Ugandan public schools is nearly 20% according to estimates by Komakech and Osuu (2014), and USAID (2019).

While there are no available estimates of learning loss due to absenteeism, the study measured this cost by calculating the lost funding on one learning hour for one student in Uganda. From the expected average teaching time of 7 hours per day, 1.9 hours of classroom time is lost due to absenteeism each day - equal to around 478 hours per year for one student. Multiplying this figure by the number of students in secondary and primary schools, and by average cost of a teaching hour per student results in annual costs equal to nearly UGX 1.5 trillion or EUR 342.8 million.

4.4. Loss of public education funds through embezzlement

Another cost to the public budget arises from embezzlement of funds meant for public education. Additionally, this type of corruption also imposes in-kind costs on the users in terms of loss of education quality. When public officials steal or divert funds or supplies intended for public education, the school and therewith the students ultimately receive less. In 1996, a World Bank survey of 250 randomly selected schools in 19 districts around the country examined school records for the previous five years and found that for the years 1991-1995, only 12.6% of the centrally allocated funds actually reached the schools. However, the share reaching schools had increased within that period, with the average amount reaching schools being 22% by 1995. The World Bank then launched a major transparency campaign which increased awareness of the funding provided by the central government, which was for a long time regarded as instrumental in reducing leakage. In 1999, the Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports commissioned a review which found that the median school by then received 90% of the central capitation entitlement.

Reinikka and Svensson undertook a public expenditure tracking survey in Uganda which found that schools had historically been significantly underfunded because grants (or significant portions thereof) were captured by local officials or politicians (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). In 2001, on average, schools received only 82% of the governmental funds to which they were entitled, with 18% siphoned off at the local level.

21 For example: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7569, http://lst-iiep.iiep-unesco.org/cgi-bin/wwwi32.exe/[in=epidoc1.in]/?t2000=028720/(100)

22 https://www.unicef.org/esa/sites/unicef.org.esa/files/2019-05/UNICEF-Uganda-2016-Absenteeism-Key-Driver-Poor-Performance-Primary-Education.pdf

For many schools, especially in the poorer areas, the share of captured funds was still as high as 25% or more, but much improved on the early 1990s findings. However, Hubbard (2007) has since pointed out that, rather than being solely the consequence of increased transparency, the system for central funding of schools underwent major reform in the late 1990s, which improved conditionality and monitoring of funding considerably.

Nevertheless, the interviews suggested that leakage of central government funding is still a significant problem. One expert described the situation thus,

"... head teachers do not always use the money [school capitation grants] for the intended purposes. They re-direct it to other needs. They then 'cook' the figures. Boards of governors do not always act to prevent this, because they are beneficiaries of the diversion. This is partly where their (sitting) allowances come from." (Interview 3, Head of an anti-corruption organisation)

"Let me tell you about what happens with regard to private schools like ours. There is a financial provision made for each eligible child under the Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education (USE) policies. It is about UGX 47,000 per term. There is a verification process at district level. It includes accountability and even intelligence agents, plus representatives of the Ministry of Education. They do physical head counts at the concerned private schools to establish the correct number of children. However, in practice these same people ask for money to allow headteachers and school owners to inflate the numbers so that they get more money than they are supposed to get. If there are 200 pupils in a school, they can inflate that to 300. They say 'we are going to write 300 and then see how we can manage'. When the money comes, the fellows appear and take their cut. The bosses have agents at local level. You never see them collecting the money." (Interview 9, Management consultant)

This suggests that weaknesses in governance and accountability continue, although it is difficult to be sure of their magnitude. If we assume that the scale of losses identified in the 2001 research is similar today, then the average estimate of 18% loss in grants due to embezzlement translated into 2019 data on public education funds would suggest costs of UGX 244 billion or EUR 57.24 million.

Embezzlement of public education funds negatively affects students' outcomes through the reduction of school inputs and infrastructure (Ferraz, Finan & Moreira, 2012). In particular, students from corrupt municipalities score lower on tests, have higher dropout and failure rates and receive less teaching supplies. The losses to their learning opportunities may translate into decreased productivity and lifetime earnings of students. For instance, Bedi and Edwards (2002) find a significant positive effect of school quality (measured through teacher training, school infrastructure and school crowding) on students' future incomes. However, it is hard to develop a numeric estimate for this "in-kind" type of corruption costs.

Such problems might be mitigated if the inspection system were more adequate, enabling the state to identify schools that were performing poorly or where resources seemed to be going astray. However, the inspection system is massively under-resourced, meaning that it is difficult for inspectors to carry out their role. Underfunding also makes them vulnerable to corruption, as one interviewee explained:

"Some of these inspectors say that they cannot do their work because there are no travel allowances. And when he comes to your school, he cannot go empty-handed. As the headmaster, you have to think of how to deal with that. You can tell the PTA people that 'there is a visitor here who wants lunch'. Inspectors come to look at how students are studying, infrastructure, and general sanitation and any problems there may be in a school. Some come and take money and write reports. They don't look around. They ask you about this and that and write. If you don't give them an envelope, they will recommend that you be transferred to a school where you will suffer. As a headmaster you live in constant fear." (Interview 23, Retired headmaster)

4.5. Costs to the physical and mental wellbeing of students

A special type of transactional cost to students is so-called "sextortion" - i.e., sexual harassment and extortion by teachers in exchange for favours, which includes "sex for grades". Sextortion is a type of corruption where sex rather than cash is the currency of the bribery exchange. According to a 2013 UNICEF survey[23], some 78% of surveyed primary school children and 82% of secondary school students in Uganda reported having experienced sexual abuse at school. It is important to acknowledge that this study uses a broad definition of sexual abuse[24], as well as the fact that not all of the reported cases might have taken place in exchange for grades or other teacher favours. In the household survey, 10% of respondents reported that, in the last 5 years, at least once it happened that a teacher or school official proposed to a child from her/his household or a child he/she knows that they could grant benefits, such as good grades or passing a test, in exchange for sexual favours.

Besides sextortion, nearly 14% of respondents[25] reported that their oldest child had experienced misbehaviour from a teacher or school official. In particular, teachers and school officials behaved aggressively towards students, for example, beating and insulting them for arriving late, giving wrong answers, or refusing to buy a particular textbook that was required by the school. Some respondents reported that their motivation for paying extra to teachers was to secure good behaviour from teachers towards their children.

The in-kind cost of this type of corruption is the physical and mental wellbeing of students as a result of the abuse. In the long run, it can lead to poor learning outcomes, unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections. It also contributes to higher drop-out rates hence affecting the overall education attainment, especially of girls and young women.

4.6. Losses owing to corruption in procurement of key infrastructure

Corruption in education procurement occurs in the different phases of the procurement cycle, as well as in the various types of contracts such as provision of school supplies, textbooks, and meals, as well as construction of classrooms and school buildings. Procurement corruption in the sector costs significant amounts of money for the public budget, negatively affects the learning environment and undermines quality of education and students' learning outcomes.

" Money goes out (of the ministry) and money comes back (as kickbacks). That is the order of things. It is engineered by big people in the Ministry. The points of haemorrhage are at the ministry and with local governments. What is left to get things done is not that significant. That affects the quality of everything." (Interview 8, Senior official of an anti-corruption agency)

Low-level transactional corruption in the procurement process, such as bribery, can lead to a loss of value-for-money if a public contract is awarded to a company that does not submit the best bid but is rather the highest-paying or best-connected. Where these corruption mechanisms happen on a larger scale and become institutionalised into a high-level type of corruption, the costs to the public budget and society at large are likely to be significant.

First, systemic transactional corruption in public procurement is likely to affect the public budget by increasing procurement prices and providing poor value for money. Multiple interviewees reported that in construction of education facilities, contractors are often

23 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5614036de4b0014b6b21ce4f/t/57473aae40261de8e-3aea696/1464285877619/Child+Protection%2C+Safety+%26+Security+in+Uganda+Schools.pdf

24 "Sexual abuse in this study is defined as sexual contact with a child such as sexual touching and fondling, kissing, and penetrative sex or defilement; as well as engaging a child in other sexual behavior that she or he does not comprehend or give consent to, such as indecent exposure of sexual objects, engaging in sex in front of a child, encouraging children to engage in prostitution, or sharing pornography with a child.", Ibid., p. 2

25 Sample of households with a child of school age that responded to a question "In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, has a child from your household experienced misbehaviour, such as aggressive behaviour, from a teacher or school official?" (N=844)

selected based on bribes or/and political connections.

"You bid and compete with others. But there are preferred companies. They get inside information because they understand what the officers want. Those who manage the bidding processes can even pull out some of your papers to make sure your bid does not measure up to the requirements." (Interview 9, Management consultant)

As a consequence of weak supervision and enforcement of the initial contracts, the cost of such projects is inflated - typically in increased wages or material costs in the awarded contract or in re-negotiated costs during contract implementation.

"Headteachers conniving with contractors or district engineers to cream off money from resources meant for building infrastructure: classrooms, laboratories and dormitories." (Interview 7, Officials of an anti-corruption agency)

"[...] by the time the work starts, a lot of the contract money would have gone into greasing the palms of officials: auditors, engineers, Chief Administrative Officers, Chief Finance Officers, etc. in some case contractors pay 10 percent at every stage." (Interview 7, Officials of an anti-corruption agency)

Second, favouritism in the allocation of contracts typically leads to outcomes such as lower quality goods, works or services, delays in the provision of essential medicines, infrastructure and services, and the provision of the wrong types of goods, works or services, which do not meet actual needs. This constitutes a deadweight loss and thus an indirect cost to society. While in the Ugandan context, there is no reliable data on contract implementation and the quality of procured goods and services available, interview evidence confirms this effect. The interviewees reported multiple cases where contractors delivered works or goods of low quality or did not deliver at all. Furthermore, low quality of construction works puts students and teachers in danger. There have been multiple cases of schools collapsing in Uganda leading to the deaths of students, teachers, and construction workers[26].Unfortunately, available education procurement data does not allow us to derive a comprehensive estimate for the cost of procurement corruption in the sector.

In particular, there is no extensive list of procuring entities in the education sector to filter for relevant tenders. Another approach for identifying relevant procurement contracts - filtering for a relevant CPV[27] division[28] (80 - "Education and training services") and keywords (e.g., "school") in the contract titles - would lead to underestimating the cost.

4.7. Loss of education quality for students

Corruption negatively affects the quality of education in multiple ways[29]. Firstly, bribery and diversion of resources from schools through embezzlement raises the cost of education for students and constrains access to education. This situation is especially harmful for less affluent social groups. In our survey, 5% of households with school age children report that at least one child did not attend school (and not because they are too young). The most common reason cited was that official fees were too expensive. Second, misappropriation of school funds, as well as corruption in procurement of school

26 For example, a school collapse in Mpigi in 2019 took the lives of several construction workers; see https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/workers-survive-death-as-three-storied-building-collapses . In the same year, an incident in the Lohana high school in Kampala led to death of six children; see https://observer.ug/news/headlines/61126-collapsed-lohana-high-school-wall-kills-six-children .

27 CPV codes are a system of classification for public procurement which uses standardised vocabulary to help procurement personnel classify their contract notices consistently and to make it easier for suppliers and contracting authorities to find notices. The first two digits of CPV code identify the division (XX000000-Y).

28

29 https://www.u4.no/publications/education-sector-corruption-how-to-assess-it-and-ways-to-address-it.pdf

supplies and infrastructure, negatively affects the learning environment and working conditions of teachers. Konte (2017) analysed data from a sample of African countries and found a significant relationship between the integrity of the local governments and the quality of the learning inputs (e.g., textbooks), as well as the teaching in public schools.

Thirdly, corruption in teacher employment (bribery, nepotism, favouritism, and forgery of documents lowers the quality of teaching as vacant positions can be taken by unqualified candidates. Along with absenteeism, this hinders the quality of teaching and creates disruptions in the learning process.

Finally, corruption generally undermines the attitude towards education in society which is harmful not only for the quality of education but also for the work ethic. A study by the African Development Bank group[30] suggests that, in a corrupt education system, the aggregate effort level of students is lower since more individuals may choose the strategy of obtaining credentials without the need to exert effort. This was confirmed in this study, as multiple interviewees mentioned that due to the lack of trust in public schools and their usefulness, parents are not willing to support the learning of their children:

"Local parents do not care for education. They do not care whether children attend school or not." (Interview 69, Headteacher)

"Some parents now say that their children are "Baan aba Museveni" (Museveni's children). They insist that they are not supposed to contribute anything." (Interview 70, Senior Inspector)

However, lack of enough data and additional literature on this phenomenon does not allow us to develop the numeric estimate for loss of education quality due to corruption.

4.8. Potential loss of income due to lost education/low quality education

It is well established that there is a positive relationship between academic achievement and attainment and labour market outcomes (Foster and Rodgers, 1980; Murnane et al, 2001; World Bank, 2018). Better-educated individuals are more likely to achieve higher earnings and have less chances of facing unemployment. Therefore, reduction in both quality and quantity in education as a result of corruption can have negative consequences for the future wellbeing of students. Furthermore, it is disproportionally costly for future earnings of students from disadvantaged backgrounds and remote areas who cannot afford private education.

Studies in different contexts (Barouni and Broecke, 2014) show that additional years of education at the upper-secondary and tertiary levels give the greatest returns on earnings, while the effect of more schooling at the primary level is lower. Therefore, corruption that restricts access to education (for example, bribery and embezzlement of school funds) is especially costly in terms of individuals' earnings. It is especially relevant for Uganda since the country has one of the highest primary education drop-out rates worldwide[31].

The World Bank (2018) suggests that an additional year of schooling results in a 9% increase in hourly earnings. Barouni and Broecke (2014) found that the rate of return for education in 12 African countries, including Uganda, is more than 7% for primary education, and more than 25% - for upper secondary and tertiary education levels. Another cross-country study (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004) suggests that an additional year of education is associated with a 10% increase of an individual's income.

30 https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/wps_no_337_effect_of_corruption_on_educational_quantity_and_quality_theory_and_evidence_.pdf

31 https://gcap.global/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/OUT_OF_SCHOOL_CHILDREN_STUDY_REPORT__FINAL_REPORT_2014.pdf

4.9. Lost productivity and economic growth due to low quality of education

Studies show that education quality is an important factor of economic growth (for example, see Barro, 1991; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Barro and Lee, 2015), in particular, in Sub-Saharan Africa (Glewwe et al., 2014). Constrained access and lower quality of education undermines productivity of the population, and hinders economic development, as well as conserves inequality and poverty. Accordingly, corruption in education that erodes quality of learning creates costs not only for users of education services and the public budget but society at large.

Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) have found that a one standard deviation increase in quality of schooling leads to a 1.3 - 2.0 percentage point increase in economic growth. Another study (OECD, 2010) suggests that, for OECD countries, an intervention that increases PISA (OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment) results by 25 points would result in 3% higher GDP.

The bulk of literature that estimates the impact of education on economic growth uses cognitive skills levels (for example, PISA or PIAAC scores) as a measure of education quality (OECD, 2010). Unfortunately, Uganda does not participate in the international assessments of students' skills yet. Therefore, it is not possible to precisely estimate lost economic growth because of a lack of appropriate data capturing the quality of education, for instance, a cognitive skills test.

4.10. Corruption in the recruitment of teachers

Corruption in the recruitment of teachers exacerbates low-quality education. Despite high competition for teachers' positions in public schools, our qualitative research revealed that the most qualified and motivated candidates often cannot get a job due to corruption in employment. In particular, bribery is a common practice in the hiring of teachers. For example, one respondent (Interview 48, Basic science teacher) said that to get a job in a grade III school, a candidate has to pay about UGX 3 million.

Bribery in recruitment of teachers is exacerbated by the labour market conditions - when there are more candidates than available positions. Several interviewees mentioned that teachers prefer to work at public schools since they provide job security, while in private schools, teachers can be fired any time. Also, teachers in private schools are more vulnerable financially since they often do not get paid in periods of school breaks or school closures due to lockdown.

As a result, candidates for teaching positions are sometimes willing to pay bribes to get a job in the public sector even "*even before anyone asks*" (Interview 48, basic science teacher).

Bribery in the hiring process often facilitates employment of candidates that have forged documents about their qualifications or have no documents at all. This corruption type leads to loss in education quality. A study by Kasirye (2009) suggests that qualifications is the most important characteristic that influences student outcomes. This study confirmed that fake qualifications is a common corruption-related problem in Uganda.

"In Namutumba District where the interviewee comes from, a few years ago an investigation discovered that 30 percent of all the teachers had fake papers." (Interview 9, Management consultant)

Together with loss of education quality for users, corruption in employment leads to costs for the public budget, since unqualified workers receive salaries from the government:

"Every year almost 600 teachers are appointed on the basis of forged papers, and are earning salaries. This costs the government about 7 billion shillings per year." (Interview 4, Senior official at the Education Service Commission).

Fair competition in recruitment is also undermined by favoritism, nepotism, and political interference. Interviewees shared examples when politicians, especially at the local

government level, influenced recruitment processes in schools. As one interviewee mentioned: "local leaders submit lists of names of candidates to be accorded preferential treatment" (Interview 49, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer). While most respondents said that politicians used their influence to secure jobs for their friends and relatives, one interviewee shared cases when education officials and headteachers colluded to employ candidates with forged papers to make them apply for salary loans:

"After teachers with forged documents are recruited, they are then obliged to apply for salary loans. These are then drawn and given to their collaborators within the district administration. ... If say 10 teachers apply for loans of 10 million shillings and succeed and hand it to their recruiters, that is 200 million shillings." (Interview 4, Senior official at the Education Service Commission)

Another problem relates to transfers of teachers. Multiple interviewees suggested that transfers to more preferable places are often secured through bribes to head teachers or/ and education officers.

On the other hand, transfers are sometimes used as a mechanism of pressure or punishment used by headteachers, education officers or even influential local politicians - to get rid of teachers they do not like.

"Teachers would be posted to schools in remote areas as a form of punishment, or from rural areas to urban areas in return for bribes. Teachers posted to rural schools could bribe their way back to urban areas after very short periods of time, putting rural schools at a disadvantage." (Interview 4, Senior official at the Education Service Commission)

However, due to lack of relevant data on the prevalence of these practices, we are not able to precisely estimate costs of corruption in teachers' employment.

4.11. Other forms of Corruption

a. Briber y in the monitoring of schools

Interviews with education sector practitioners revealed that the process of monitoring schools is prone to corruption. School inspectors can ask bribes from headteachers in exchange for positive assessments of the school.

"Before important people visit the school, they call and tell the head-teacher: "I am coming there, prepare for me some fuel". Or they could say "you have taken too long to visit us". This means that they want "something" (money). For you to be maintained here as head-teacher, you have to give envelopes. If you don't, they transfer you and bring somebody who will comply." (Interview 48, Senior official at the Education Service Commission)

While this form of corruption is costly for already underfunded schools, it is also harmful for the education system in general. The lack of strong monitoring facilitates misappropriation of school funds since inspectors can overlook problems in exchange for bribes.

b. Briber y in School Management Committees

School Management Committees (SMCs) are representative bodies that engage members of communities to monitor school operations, particularly the spending of capitation grants. Although SMCs are mandated to provide oversight over school activities and ensure integrity, our qualitative study revealed cases of extortion among SMCs members. As one interviewer told us: *"in some schools, the SMC chairman will not sign off anything without being paid"* (Interview 69, Headteacher).

Another interviewee, a headteacher of a primary school, shared the story of her conflict with the SMC chairman who refused to sign any approvals for operations with funds after she

refused to give him a bribe of about UGX 50,000.

Our interviewees has also revealed cases of collusion between headteachers and SMCs members for misappropriation of capitation grants.

c. Teachers using public school resources for private purposes

Another type of corruption that appears in the interviews is the use of public school resources for teachers' private gain. In particular, teachers can take learning inputs, such as textbooks, to use them in private schools or for private tutoring.

"*One of teachers is the director of a private school. He absents himself to teach at his school. He even takes textbooks from Waiga to his school. [...] He even poaches good pupils from Waiga and recruits them for his school.*" (Interview 69, Headteacher)

This type of corruption diverts learning inputs from students of public schools and further increases costs of education for less affluent households.

d. Costs of positive attitude towards corruption among students gained through observing corruption in the school system

Previous studies suggest that corruption in schools negatively affects socialization of students and shapes their attitudes in a way that makes young people more tolerant to corruption[32]. The East Africa Youth Survey Report (2016)[33] shows that up to 58% of respondents in Uganda believed it did not matter how one made money as long as one did not end up in jail, and up to 45% believed corruption was profitable. Furthermore, up to 73% of surveyed youth answered that they would fear to report and/or resist wrongdoing. Such attitudes to corruption among young people are likely to sustain and even increase high levels of corruption in the country.

32 https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/global-corruption-report-education

33 https://ecommons.aku.edu/eastafrica_eai/20/

Chapter Five:

Summary of key findings

This report has outlined several types of corruption occurring in the education sector in Uganda, and summarized the various direct and indirect costs arising from each type.

First, costs occur due to users (students and their families) having to bribe an education provider (teacher, school officials, examiner etc.) for the delivery of a service that should be delivered free of charge or for an official fee. This cost especially threatens low income households and may serve as a barrier to access to education. Using bribery prevalence and average bribe size estimates from our household survey, we estimate the cost of UGX 39.1 billion.

The next two costs are related to teacher absenteeism. Firstly, undue absence of teachers from work is costly for the public budget in terms of "wasted" salaries. The estimated annual cost for the public budget amounts to UGX 180.5 billion in 2019. Accordingly, teachers absenteeism decreases both quantity and quality of learning for students. While the available data does not allow us to develop a comprehensive estimate for loss of learning due to absenteeism, we found that the cost of education hours was about UGX 1.5 trillion.

Next, this report estimates the cost of the embezzlement of public education funds. As public officials steal or divert funds or supplies intended for public education, the school and therewith the students ultimately receive less. We quantify the annual loss of public education funds of UGX 244.6 billion. Additionally, this form of corruption bears non-measurable in-kind costs for students in terms of loss of education quality.

This report also discussed several costs that we were not able to precisely estimate due to lack of the relevant data and literature. These are: 1) costs to physical and mental wellbeing of students due to abuse and sextortion, 2) costs of corruption in procurement of school infrastructure and inputs, 3) loss of education quality for students due to corruption, 4) loss of income/earning potential due to lower quality and attainment, 5) lost productivity and economic growth due to low quality of corruption, 6) costs of positive attitudes towards corruption among students gained through observing corruption in the school system.

Based on the data from qualitative estimates, the study discusses corruption in teachers' employment that results in both lower quality of education, and costs for the public budget in terms of wages paid to unqualified teachers. The forms of corruption in employment include forgery of documents about qualifications, bribery in hiring and allocation of transfers, favouritism and nepotism.

Finally, the study found a number of other forms of corruption based on the qualitative study: bribery in monitoring of schools, and activities of School Management Committees, as well as the practice of teachers using school resources for private ben .

Limitations of the study

Researching corruption and its costs is difficult since most corrupt activities are hidden and those who are involved in them have an interest in concealing evidence. Individuals working in the system may have an imperfect understanding of the risks and/or may not accurately report them. Even experts on corruption rely heavily on the limited pool of corruption incidents that they observe as

well as an assessment of governance risks that may facilitate corruption. As noted, any corruption-related costs are likely to be spread over time and thus may be inadequately captured in a cross-sectional survey. This research therefore has limitations which should be recognised when designing any policy interventions. However, the study sought to address these difficulties by using a range of methods to elicit different kinds of information from different types of stakeholders, seeking to provide an extensive mapping of the range of risks and costs, while recognising that prevalence and magnitude can only be estimated.

Therefore, the proposed estimates represent a lower-down estimate of corruption costs in the education sector in Uganda.

Chapter Six:

Interpretation and policy recommendations

Following the discussion of drivers of corruption, we provide conclusions and policy recommendations for each of the drivers - corruption as a principal-agent problem, corruption as a collective action problem, and corruption as a problem-solving functionality.

6.1 Corruption as principal-agent problem

Our qualitative research suggests that corruption in public education is facilitated by weak oversight and enforcement. This problem exists in different areas of policy implementation and service provision in the sector. In particular, our qualitative research suggests that, in the education procurement, there is a lack of an independent oversight of the procurement process. Also, some respondents highlighted weak monitoring over quality of procured goods and works during the implementation stage.

"It is common for contractors who do not have a track record of good performance to be awarded several contracts across a number of districts. Contracts are awarded to firms that do not possess the required competence, experience, or money to execute the projects. [...] Officials hire firms that are prepared to give them kickbacks." (Interview 1, Senior official of an anti-corruption agency)

"The common ones are when district engineers who are supposed to supervise construction works to ensure good quality work, end up not supervising, usually because the contractors have bought them off." (Interview 7, Officials of an anti-corruption agency)

Interviews with practitioners in the sector revealed that school inspections fail to implement their monitoring function. This can be partly explained by the lack of funding and resources received by inspectors. For example, multiple interviewees told us that inspectors often do not have a working vehicle to get to a school and need to use their own means of transportation. As a result, inspections do not cover all schools, and where they do happen, inspectors cannot conduct a thorough assessment due to lack of resources.

"The district has only two inspectors for all the 167 schools. This is a major challenge. They do not reach some schools." (Interview 49, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer)

As interviews confirmed, insufficient funding in education inspectorates incentivises inspectors to extort "compensation" from headteachers. This way, some schools can hide problems with bribery. However, as interviews suggest, outright bribery in the monitoring process happens not only due to poor funding of inspectors and auditors; one headteacher shared in the interview that inspectors can extort bribes by threatening headteachers with transfers to schools in remote areas.

"Some of these inspectors say that they cannot do their work because there are no travel allowances. And when he comes to your school, he cannot go empty-handed. As the headmaster, you have to think of how to deal with that. You can tell the PTA [Parent Teachers Association] people that "there is a visitor here who wants lunch." (Interview 22, Headmaster)

Another issue regarding the monitoring of schools is that auditors and inspectors do not engage in detailed investigations and rely only on documents submitted by headteachers. Furthermore, interviewees emphasized that inspections often omit important aspects of school functionality, such as quality of teaching and learning.

"Auditors depend on what teachers submit as accountability. They do not go to the ground." (Interview 64, District Education Officer)

"They just pass by, sign books, talk to a few teachers, and move on." (Interview 15, senior administrative official)

While some interviewees explained the unsatisfactory performance with lack of integrity and bribery among auditors and inspectors:

"They [headteachers] prepare envelopes for them [inspectors]. Then the inspectors come up with good reports. Auditors are accorded the same treatment. Brown envelopes have bred problems." (Interview 3, Head of an anti-corruption organisation)

Multiple respondents also stressed the lack of staff and basic resources to maintain their work such as vehicles and gas to get to schools. The 2020 Annual Report[34] of the Auditor General confirms that lack of funding due to the pandemic negatively affected the work of the office.

Recommendations:

- Allocate resources to schools inspectors and auditors for traveling and executing oversight functions effectively and regularly.
- Strengthen community monitoring of schools by parents, civil society organisations and traditional leaders to supplement and triangulate the services of auditors and inspectors.
- Improve corporate beneficial ownership transparency so that the owners of firms that supply goods and works to public schools can be monitored and sanctioned if needed.
- Improve the rules – and monitoring of compliance – around conflicts of interest in public procurement, to avoid awarding contracts to politically connected suppliers.
- Encourage Ministry of Education and Inspectorate of Government to work together to mainstream anti-corruption in education sector assessments and plans, so that corruption is regularly included as a threat to the achievement of sector goals, and measures to address it are included in sector plans and policies.
- Review teacher licensing process and strengthen the enforcement of the Teachers' Code of Conduct by the Education Service Commission against errant teachers.

6.2 Corruption as a collective action problem

Similar to other areas of the Ugandan public sector, there is no effective system to eliminate conflicts of interest in the procurement process. Different actors at different stages of the procurement process use the lack of oversight to secure contracts for politically connected firms, increase price for contracts, and compromise quality or even delivery/implementation of procured goods and works.

"You bid and compete with others. But there are preferred companies. They get inside information because they understand what the officers want. Those who manage the bidding processes can even pull out some of your papers to make your bid does not measure up to the requirements. As a result, their preferred companies win the contracts." (Interview 9, Management consultant)

Another notable example of a collective action problem in the education sector is weak engagement of communities, and especially parents, in oversight over schools. Although there are organizations to monitor and participate in governance of schools - Parents Teachers Associations (PTA) and School Management Committees (SMC), our qualitative investigation suggests that parents are not always able to fully use these opportunities.

34 http://www.oag.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/OAG-PERFORMANCE-REPORT-2020-FINAL.pdf

Multiple interviewees mentioned that PTAs face significant challenges with mobilising local parents and securing additional funding (e.g., for meals for students).

Qualitative evidence also suggests that, while difficulties with parents' engagement can occur due to poverty, sometimes this is a more complicated issue. In particular, some respondents it was because of a lack of understanding of the value of education, and poor government communication on the matter.

"Politicians are uttering reckless statements. They are telling parents that the children are for the government and they say the children are Museveni's and we are not supposed to contribute anything." (Interview 50, Senior inspector)

Moreover, as some interviewees mentioned, PTA and SMC members even expect to benefit from their supposedly voluntary, non-profitable roles. As the interviews revealed, bribery is quite common among SMC's members.

"People believe we have a lot of money. If they [PTA members] come to school, they expect to get something. If they don't, they drop out because they don't benefit anything. Out of 13 members, only 5 are active." (Interview 15, Headteacher)

Recommendations:

- Improve public procurement tenders, making them more open and competitive breaking up closed networks of collusive companies and officials.
- Improve post-award monitoring of procurement contracts, involving school communities (e.g. teachers, parents) receiving the goods and services procured.
- Increase awareness of parents about opportunities and benefits of participation in oversight and governance of schools, in particular, through Parents Teachers Associations.
- Improve whistleblowing mechanisms and provide headteachers and Parents Teachers Associations with effective and safe ways to report extortion from the School Management Committee members.
- Conduct information and education campaigns to raise awareness of reporting channels for corruption, including anti-corruption institutions such as the Inspectorate of Government, or anti-corruption NGOs such as Transparency International and the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda.

6.3 Corruption as problem-solving functionality

In the education sector, corruption often appears to be a mechanism that individuals and institutions use to adapt and cope with the weaknesses in the system. Corruption as a problem-solving functionality is most prevalent in teachers' employment.

Most interviewees agree that poor working conditions of staff is an important driver of absenteeism. Lack of housing and low wages often cause undue absence and late comings.

"*Because of their meagre earnings, teachers contract loans from banks. Some even go to money leaders and get more loans. At the end of the month, you find loan sharks at banks with many ATM cards to withdraw money from the accounts of these teachers. This leaves teachers without money to make ends meet. They then must find ways to do so. They can't prioritize teaching."* (Interview 62, Chief Administrative Officer)

"*We can't accommodate even half of the number of teachers in schools. Decent housing is very difficult to find. This is a contributor to absenteeism and abscondment from duty."* (Interview 62, Chief Administrative Officer)

However, some interviewees highlighted that absenteeism happens not just because of poor working conditions, but also because of lack of supervision.

For instance, one respondent emphasized that some teachers have acquired "the habit of absenteeism" and schools need to introduce additional supervision in order to eliminate undue absences (Interview 64, District Education Officer).

Another example of corruption as a coping mechanism that we have found in the qualitative data is employment of unqualified teachers in remote and/or rural areas. Since schools in such areas often face shortage of teachers, they are more willing to accept candidates with forged or no papers.

Recommendations:

- Increase funding for accommodation and payments for public school teachers.
- Create additional incentives such as hardship allowances for qualified teachers to work in schools in rural/remote areas.

Annex A. Red flag methodology to analyse procurement data

We applied the 'red flag' methodology to analyse corruption risks and associated direct costs in public spending as represented by public procurement to the dataset on national spending. The dataset for analysis contains 50,000 public procurement records covering the period of 2015-2020, including sectoral procurement data on education.

This methodology builds on corruption risk indicators and corruption cost estimates calculated using well-established methods (see, for example, Fazekas & Kocsis, 2015). The corruption risk indicators that we developed proxy corruption by identifying high-risk situations where open and fair competition has been curtailed in order to benefit a favoured firm. For example, when only one firm submits a bid on an otherwise competitive market and the bid advertisement period was only 1 working day, the chances are higher that tendering decisions were driven by corruption. We carry out a series of econometric tests identifying the best parameters for our indicators (e.g. how many days would count as a very short advertisement period in different contexts) and validating them. All these indicators are also confirmed by proven cases and economic theories of crime. In order to use a robust risk indicator, we aggregate several red flags into a composite score by simply averaging them (where 0 is lowest corruption risk and 1 highest); we call this the Corruption Risk Index.

For Uganda, the red flags that can be calculated based on the available data include:

- Non-open procedure type
- Lack of call for tender publication
- Short bid submission period
- Length of decision period
- Single bidder contract
- Spending concentration (by organisation, by year)

Our methodology also links corruption risks to spending based on econometric modelling which estimates the price sensitivity of awarded contracts to corruption risks. We predict the size of discounts offered by the winning firm compared to the auction reference price (that is typically the maximum budgetary allocation for a given purchase) based on corruption risks while controlling for year, contract value, main market, buyer location, and buyer type on the contract level. Finally, these models allow us to bridge our large-scale micro-level dataset with macro aggregates such as budget deficit and to offer different macro spending estimates based on different risk levels in each country and sector.

Annex B. Full logistic regression results for figures 3 and 5

	Coef.	P-value
Age	0.11	0.201
Female	-0.03	0.879
Household size	0.69	0.000
Poverty	0.71	0.000
Urban	-0.56	0.007
Western	1.14	0.002
Central	0.70	0.069
Eastern	1.66	0.000
Constant	-7.42	0.000
LR Chi2	121.12	
Prob Chi2	0.000	
Pseudo R2	0.14	
N	1,621	

Note on variable measurement: Age:1) 18-24, 2) 25-34, 3) 35-44, 4) 45-54, 5) 55+; Female: 1) female; Household size: 1) less than 2, 2) 2-4, 3) 5-10, 4) >10; Poverty: mean response to questions about frequency of going without food to eat, clean water, cash income, electricity, and essential clothing, in the last year, with possible responses: 1) never, 2) once or twice, 3) 3 to 5 times, 4) >5 times; Urban: 1) Urbanite, 0) not; Regions: 1) resident of region with baseline as the North.

Full logistic regression of associations with experienced absenteeism (figure 5)

	Coef.	P-value
Age	0.01	0.897
Female	-0.27	0.069
Poverty	0.45	0.000
Urban	-0.09	0.524
N of Children in HH	0.20	0.000
Western	-0.85	0.000
Central	-1.42	0.000
Eastern	-0.62	0.000
Constant	-2.02	0.000
LR Chi2	123.71	
Prob Chi2	0.000	
Pseudo R2	0.09	
N	1,303	

Note on variable measurement: Age:1) 18-24, 2) 25-34, 3) 35-44, 4) 45-54, 5) 55+; Female: 1) female; Poverty: mean response to questions about frequency of going without food to eat, clean water, cash income, electricity, and essential clothing, in the last year, with possible responses: 1) never, 2) once or twice, 3) 3 to 5 times, 4) >5 times; Urban: 1) Urbanite, 0) not; N of children in HH: number; Regions: 1) resident of region with baseline as the North.

Annex C. Survey methodology and questionnaire

Sample design

The sampling relied on the list of enumeration areas (EA) from the Uganda Population and Housing Census 2014 as a sample frame. There are a total of 79303 EAs with one area containing more than one hundred households in Uganda. The Census contains information about location, type (urban or rural) and population of EAs allowing for the stratification of the sample.

In order to get reliable survey results at national, regional (Central, Eastern, Northern, Western regions) and sectoral (healthcare and education) levels, we applied a two-stage stratified, clustered sampling. At the first stage, the sample was stratified according to 4 regions, namely Central, Eastern, Northern and Western. Next, each region was divided into urban and rural areas. As a result, we got 8 sampling strata. From each stratum, we selected EAs using probability proportional to population size (PPS) sampling procedure to ensure that the probability of a cluster being selected is proportional to its size.

The list of sampled EAs is provided in Annex F.

Selection of households

We used a random walk method to identify and select 30 households in each enumeration area. The random walk method was administered by the field supervisors with the assistance of local guides in each enumeration area.

The following steps were followed to select 30 households in each EA:

1. Identify and contact a village LC 1 official to support the team during field movements and in identifying selected households and community boundaries.
2. Determine the EA sampling interval (Nth) by dividing the number of households in the EA by 30.
3. Identify a central location within the EA like the market, a church, a health facility or the junction between two roads and use it as a starting point for household selection
4. The field supervisors selects a random direction from the central location by spinning a bottle. Thereafter, the field supervisor follows a road path in the selected random direction while selecting and assigning every Nth household to the data collectors.
5. On reaching the EA boundary (as guided by the village LC official), another random direction is determined again by spinning the bottle. This process is continued until when 30 households have been identified, selected and assigned to data collectors.
6. During times of uncertainly about which households to interview, the field supervisor uses a random selection process to decide which household to interview just by flipping a coin.
7. Interviewing stops when the required 30 households have been selected.

8. Two further attempts are made to interview residents who are not at home when initially visited.

Within a selected household, the household head aged 18 years and above or any available responsible adult is interviewed.

Inclusion criteria:

- Respondent must be resident of the household for at least 12 months.
- Respondent should be aged 18 years and above.

Exclusion criteria:

- Members of the household that are unable to provide consent.
- Exclude households that haven't had a household member suffering a serious illness episode or was pregnant in the last 12 months and that have no children in the age bracket of 6-18 years.

Sample size

The decision about sample size was made considering the factors of survey precision, operational and financial limitations of the project. To allow inferences about corruption prevalence both at the national level and among the four regions, the sufficient sample size is at least 1600 respondents or 400 respondents per region (with the design effect of 1.1). The above listed sample sizes are calculated for the estimated values of the key indicator near 50% to account for the maximum margin of error. An overall sample size of 1760 was estimated after inflating by 10% to account for the non-response.

Quality Assurance

In order to ensure quality of collected data, the following field controls were implemented:

In order to verify that field teams were able to reach the selected entrepreneurs, we collected GPS coordinates for every completed site. We have carefully reviewed and visualized geographical locations of interviews to detect interviews with duplicate locations or outside of the particular EA.

We randomly selected interviews for control, made call-backs and checked the fact of the interview, adherence to the survey methodology, and the correspondence of answers to key questions. Overall, nearly 10% of the sample were randomly included into the back check sample.

Annex D. Survey questionnaire

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NATIONAL SURVEY ON THE EXTENT AND COST OF CORRUPTION IN HEALTH AND EDUCATON SECTORS IN UGANDA (EDUCATION PART)

Pre-interview information

Date	
District	
Sub county	
Parish/Ward	
Village/cell	

Urban/rural	Urban=1 Rural=2 Peri-urban=3
Interviewer number	

Informed consent

Good morning/ Good afternoon

Hello, My name is _____. I am working with the International Research Consortium (IRC) - show the letter from the LCI. IRC is a research firm which was contracted by GIZ to conduct a survey about the extent and cost of corruption in the health and education sectors in Uganda. The study was approved by the TASO Uganda Ethics Research Committee and registered by the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST).

The survey will target 1,600 households and your household is among those that were chosen randomly for the survey. Your views will be taken to represent views of many households who have not been selected to participate.

I would like to ask you some questions about your opinions on corruption in health and education sectors. These questions can take 25-35 minutes to complete. The information you give will be treated with strict confidentiality and your name will not be printed or used in any documents. You are free to accept or decline to participate in either study. The answers you give will not be shared with anyone outside of the study team. There is a small chance that someone could learn about what we talked about, however, we will do our best not to let this happen.

There are no questions that will make you feel uncomfortable or embarrassed. If I ask you any question that you do not want to answer, just let me know and I will go on to the next question. You can stop the interview at any time.

There is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study. However, the information we collect will help policy makers solve corruption challenges in health and education sectors.

Study participants will get feedback on the progress and findings of the study. You can also contact the Survey Team Leader for the study, Dr. Daniel Kibuuka Musoke on Telephone number- 0772587094 for information regarding the progress and findings of the study.

If you have any concerns about the study, you can contact the TASO Research Ethics Committee

Chairperson - Dr. Adrian Jjuuko on Telephone number – 0782169505 and email - jjuukoa@gmail.com

Do you have any questions about the study or about your participation?

You can ask any questions you have about the study at any time.

Do you agree to participate in the survey?

NAME: _____ RESPONDENT AGREED_____

RESPONDENT DID NOT AGREE_____

My signature at I have read the informed consent statement to the respondents (s, and I have answered any questions asked about the study.

INTERVIEWER'S NAME AND CODE: _____ Date:_____

_____

START TIME: HOURS MINUTE

A. Screening questions

A1. **In the past 6 months, have you or someone from your household had a significant illness episode or was pregnant?**
INTERVIEWER READS DEFINITION: *Serious illness episode is an episode when you or someone from your household needed medical treatment but not necessarily visited a health worker.*

1=Yes

2=No

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

A2. **If yes, please, specify. (multiple choice)**

1=Measles

2=Diarrhea

3=Birth related

4=Skin

5=Ulcers

6=Flu & cold

7=Hypertension

8=COVID-19

9=Long-term physical condition (e.g. diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease)

10=Trauma/injury

11=Surgery (for other than the above listed reasons)

12=Infectious disease with fever

13=Malaria

14=Depression or other emotional/mental problems

15=Other (specify)

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

A3. **When did a significant illness episode or pregnancy happen?**

1=Less than a month ago

2=2-3 months ago

3=3-6 months ago

4=More than 6 months ago

A4. **In the most recent significant illness episode, did you or someone from your household receive outpatient treatment (did not stay overnight in hospital) or inpatient treatment (stayed overnight in hospital) ?**

1=Outpatient treatment

2=Inpatient treatment

3=Both

4=Neither of them

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

A5. **Is there a child of school age (6-18) in the household?**

1=Yes

2=No

IF YES, GO TO A6.

A6. **How many children of school age are in the household?** (INTERVIEWER RECORDS A NUMERIC RESPONSE)

IF ANSWER TO A1 AND A5 IS NO, END THE INTERVIEW; OTHERWISE, GO TO THE MODULE B.

B. Demographic and social characteristics of the household

Household respondent profile

B1. **What is the position of the respondent in the household?**

1=Head
2=Spouse of the head
3=Child of the head
4=Grand child of the head
5=Parent of the head
6=Sister/brother of the head 7=Nephew/niece of the head
8=Non-relative
10=Other (specify)

B2**. What is the nationality of the household respondent?**

1=Ugandan
2=Non-Ugandan

B3. **Is the household respondent male or female?**1=Male
2=Female

B4. **What is the age of the household respondent?**

1=18-24

2=25-34

3=35-44

4=45-54
5=55 and above

B5. **What is the marital status of the household respondent?**
1=Single
2=Married/living together
3=Divorced/separated
4=Widowed
5=Never married and never lived together
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
B6. **What is the highest level of education completed of the household respondent?**
1=None completed
2=Completed Primary
3=Completed Secondary
4=Uncompleted Vocational
5=Completed Vocational
6=Uncompleted Higher Education (University, College)
7=Completed Higher Education (University, College)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
B7. **What is the main occupation of the household respondent?**
1=Farmer
2=Trader
3=Civil servant
4=Employee in the private sector
5=Owner/co-owner of private company
6=Free-lance worker
7=Housewife/inc. on maternity leave
8=Other (specify)
B8. **If you have a spouse, what is his/her main occupation?**
1=Farmer
2=Trader
3=Civil servant
4=Employee in the private sector
5=Owner/co-owner of private company
6=Free-lance worker
7=Housewife/inc. on maternity leave
8=Other (specify)
B9. **What form of communication is easily available to the household respondent?**
1=Landline telephone
2=Email address
3=Mobile phone
4=Public phone
5=None of the above
Household information
B10. **What is the household size by number?**
INTERVIEWER READS DEFINITION: Household us a group of people who normally eat and live together.
1=Less than 2
2=2-4
3=5-10
4=More than 10

B11. **How many household members have regular income?**
1=Less than 2
2=2-4
3=5-10
4=More than 10
B12. **What is the nature of the household dwelling - a place where you and your household members usually sleep?**
1=Permanent
2=Semi-permanent
3=Temporary
4=Other (specify)
B13. **What is the type of the household dwelling?**
(OBSERVATIONAL QUESTION: INTERVIEWER OBSERVES THE DWELLING AND RECORDS THE ANSWER BASED)
1=Traditional
2=Modern
3=Other (specify)
B14. **What is the ownership of household dwelling?**
1=Self/own
2=Owned by extended family
3=Rented
4=Borrowed
5=Other (specify)
Living conditions of the household
B15. **In general, how would you describe the economic situation of the household this year, on the scale from 1 to 5:**
5=Very good
4=Fairly good
3=Neither good nor bad
2=Fairly bad
1=Very bad
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
B16. **In general, how would you describe the economic situation of the household this year compared to other people who live in your area, on the scale from 1 to 5?**
5=Much better
4=Better
3=Same
2=Worse
1=Much worse
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

B17. **And now, please imagine a ten-step ladder for your country where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich. On which step of the ten steps are you personally standing today?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	9	99
Poorest people					Richest people					Refused	Don't know

B18. **Does your household have:**

1=Electricity

2=Refrigerator

3=Radio

4=TV

5=Mobile telephone

6=Bicycle

7=Computer

8=Motorcycle

9=Car

10=A plot of land which you can use for growing agricultural products

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

B19. **What are the sources of water used by your household?**

1=Tap water

2=Stand-pipe/Water Kiosk

3=Borehole

4=Protected spring

5=Unprotected source

6=Other (specify)

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

B20. **How is excrete disposed of by your household?**

1=Water closet inside house

2=Water closet outside house

3=Own pit latrine (in yard)

4=Communal pit latrine

5=No latrine

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

B21. **What are the sources of electricity for your household?**

1=Hydropower (umeme)

2=Solar power

3=Generator

4=No electricity

5=Others (Specify)

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

B22. **Estimate your monthly household income (the combined income of all household members)**

1=5,000-50,000 UGX

2=50,001-100,000 UGX

3=100,001-500,000 UGX

4=500,001-1,000,000 UGX

5=Above 1,000,000 UGX

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

B23. **What are the main sources of household income?**

1=Farming

2=Manufacturing business

3=Trade

4=Salary or wages (government)

5=Salary or wages (private)

6=Pension, Transfer payment (from relatives and friends)

7=Soap/casual work

8=Others (specify)

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answer

B24. I**n the past 12 months, how often, if ever, have you or someone from your household:**

	Never	Once or twice	Several times	Often	Always	Don't know	Refused to answer
a. Did not have enough food to eat?							
b. Did not have clean water?							
c. Did not have enough fuel to cook food?							
c. Did not have transportation?							
d. Did not have a cash income?							
f. Did not have electricity?							
e. Did not have essential clothes, shoes?							

B25. **On average, how do you spend on the following items in the past 6 month?**

	Below 10,000=1, 10,001-50,000=2, 50,001-100,000=3, 100,001-300,000=4, Above 300,000=5
Health care	
Education	
Food	
Household utilities (energy and water)	
Cleaning materials i.e. soap	
Entertainment	
Transport	
Other (specify)	

F. Demand for service, including lack of service - education
F1. Has at least one child in your household attended a school in the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started?
1=Yes
2=No

IF NO, GO TO F2; OTHERWISE, GO TO F3

F2**. What is the reason why at least one child in your household has not attended school in the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started (multiple choices possible)?**
1=Too young
2=School is located too far away
3=Too expensive to pay official fees
4=Too expensive to pay bribes and/or extra fees
5=Working
6=Child doesn't learn anything in school
7=The education provided is not useful for child's life
8=School not hygienic
9=Concerns about COVID-19
10=Illness/disability
11=Parents not interested/ opposed to schooling
12=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

F2. **What is the reason why at least one child in your household has not attended school in the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started (multiple choices possible)?**

1=Too young
2=School is located too far away
3=Too expensive to pay official fees
4=Too expensive to pay bribes and/or extra fees
5=Working
6=Child doesn't learn anything in school
7=The education provided is not useful for child's life
8=School not hygienic
9=Concerns about COVID-19
10=Illness/disability
11=Parents not interested/ opposed to schooling
12=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

F3. **Has at least one child in your household attended a public school in the 12 months before COVID 19 lockdown started?**

1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

IF YES, GO TO F5; OTHERWISE, GO TO F4 AND THEN END THE INTERVIEW.

F4. **What was the reason why at least one child in your household did not attend a public school? (multiple choice)**

1=Private schools provide higher quality of education
2=Teachers are more committed in private schools
3=Private school is closer to our household
4=Children are more likely to pass the exams studying in private schools
5=There is corruption in public schools I want to avoid
6=Paying bribes or providing gifts for services in public schools is more expensive than paying fees in private schools
7=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

F5. **How far is the nearest school from the household?**

1=Less than 500m
2=0.5 - 1km
3=1km - 2km
4=2km - 3km
5=Over 3km
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

F6. **What is the level of the nearest public school?**
1=Pre-primary
2=Primary
3=Upper secondary
4=Lower secondary
5=Vocational
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

G. Prevalence and direct costs of corruption for users in service delivery - education

FROM NOW ON WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE OLDEST CHILD IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHO ATTENDS A PUBLIC SCHOOL.

G1. **What is the level of school that the oldest child attends?**
1=Pre-primary
2=Primary
3=Lower secondary
4=Upper secondary
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

G2. **Which grade does the oldest child attend?** (INTERVIEWER RECORDS A RESPONSE)

G3. **For how long has the oldest child been attending the school he is currently enrolled in?** (INTERVIEWER RECORDS A NUMERIC RESPONSE; IF LESS THAN 1 YEAR, RECORD 0. IF LIVED SINCE BIRTH, RECORD 99)
_____ years

G4. **In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, were you or someone from your household asked to pay a bribe, give a gift, pay extra money (but not an official fee or tutor fee) or do a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child?**
1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

G5. In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, have you or someone from your household paid a bribe, gave a gift, paid extra money (but not an official fee or tutor fee) or did a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child in order to: (multiple choice)
1=Get a place in a school for a child
2=Ensure good grades
3=Pass a test/an exam for a child
4=Express appreciation for the service provided
5=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

IF SELECTED AT LEAST ONE OPTION AMONG 1-5, GO THE NEXT QUESTION; OTHERWISE, GO TO G15

G16. In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, how many times did you or someone from your household give a bribe, make an extra payment, give a gift or do a favour per reason? And what was the value of these?

	NUMBER OF TIMES (INTERVIEWER RECORDS NUMERIC RESPONSE)	VALUE, UGX
Get a place in a school for a child		
Ensure good grades		
Pass a test/an exam for a child		
Express appreciation for the service provided		
Other (specify)		

G7. **The last time you or someone from your household had to give a bribe, make an extra payment, give a gift (the most recent event) or do a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child, who was the recipient?**

1=Teacher
2=Tutor
3=School official
4=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

G8. **The last time you or someone from your household had to make an extra payment, give a gift (the most recent event) or do a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child, what did you/someone from your household give?**

1=Food and drink
2=Valuables (gold, jewellery, phones, etc.) or other goods
3=Some money (please specify amount in national currency)
4=Exchange with another service or favour
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

IF ANSWER IS EXCHANGE WITH ANOTHER SERVICE OR FAVOUR (4) GO TO THE NEXT QUESTION, OTHERWISE GO TO G10

G9. **If you or a member of your household had to do a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child the last time, what type of favour was it?**

INTERVIEWER ASK THIS QUESTION AS AN OPEN-ENDED QUESTION AND CODES THE ANSWER.

1=Running an errand
2=Provision of labour or services
3=Sexual favour
4=Other (specify)
9= Don't know
99= Refused to answer

G10. **Recalling the most recent time you or someone from your household had to make an extra payment, give a gift or do a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child, when exactly did you give the gift/money/favour?**
1=Before the service was delivered
2=After the service was delivered
3=At the same time that the service was delivered
4=Partly before and partly after the service was delivered
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
G11. **Have you or someone from your household had to borrow money in order to give a bribe, a gift, or to make an extra payment (but not an official fee) to a teacher or an education official?**
1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
G12. **Has your household had to cut other expenses in order to give a bribe, a gift, or to make an extra payment (but not an official fee) to a teacher or an education official?**1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
G13. **In your opinion, was the received service worth the payment received from a teacher or an education official?**
1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
G14. **What would be the expected consequences if the last time you didn't pay extra for a teacher or a school official of your oldest child, including bribes, extra payments (but not an official fee or tutor fee) and the value of any gifts? (multiple choice)**
1=None
2=A child would be refused a place in school
3=A child would receive a worse mark
4=A child would fail a test
5=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
G15. **In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, have you someone from your household ever been unable or refused to pay a bribe, give a gift, pay extra money (but not an official fee or do a favour for a teacher or a school official of the oldest child?**
1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

IF YES, GO TO THE NEXT QUESTION; OTHERWISE, GO TO G17

G16. **If yes, what were the consequences?** (multiple choice)

1=None

2=A child was refused a place in school

3=A child received a worse mark

4=A child failed a test

5=Other (specify)

9=Don't know

99=Refused to answe

G17. **To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know	Refused to answer
Most people in Uganda expect to pay something extra when their children attend public schools.							
To get a place in a public school in Uganda, you must pay a bribe or extra money, give a gift or do a favour.							
If you do not pay a bribe or extra money, give a gift or do a favour, your child is less likely to pass an exam.							
If you do not pay a bribe or extra money, give a gift or do a favour, your child is likely to have bad grades.							

H. Indirect costs of corruption for users in service delivery - education

H1. How easy or difficult was it to get a place in a public school for a child?
1=Very difficult
2=Somewhat difficult
3=Neither difficult nor easy
4=Somewhat easy
5=Very easy
9= Don't know
99= Refused to answer

H2. **In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, has a child from your household missed a lesson because a teacher was absent?**
1=Yes
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

IF YES, GO TO H3; OTHERWISE, GO TO H4

H3. **In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, how often have children from your household missed a lesson because a teacher was absent?**
1=Once or twice per year
2=Several times per year
3=Once or twice per month
4=Several times per month
5=Many times per month
6=Once or twice per week
7=Several times per week
8=Many times per week
9=Don't know
99= Refused to answer

H4. **In the 12 months before COVID-19 lockdown started, has a child from your household experienced misbehaviour, such as aggressive behavior, from a teacher or school official?**
1=Yes (specify)
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

H5. **Have, if ever, children from your household done a favour for a teacher or a school official?**
1=Yes (specify)
2=No
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer
IF YES, GO TO THE NEXT QUESTION; OTHERWISE, GO TO H7.

H6. **If yes, what type of favour was it?** (multiple choice)
1=Running an errand
2=Provision of labour or services
3=Sexual favour
4=Other (specify)
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

H7. Based on your experience or experience of people you know, how often, if at all, do teachers or school officials either openly or suggestively propose students to grant benefits, such as good grades or passing a test, in exchange for sexual favours?

1=Never
2=Once or twice
3=Several times
4=Often
5=Always
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

H8. **Thinking about your own experience in the last 5 years, has it ever happened that a teacher or school official proposed to a child from your household or a child you know to grant benefits, such as good grades or passing a test, in exchange for sexual favours?**

1=Never
2=Once or twice
3=Several times
4=Often
5=Always
9=Don't know
99=Refused to answer

Annex E. Comparison of household survey estimates with the estimates from other relevant surveys.

Table E1. Comparison of household survey estimates with the estimates from secondary surveys.

Table E2. Comparison of household survey estimates with the estimates from secondary surveys.

Estimate	Household survey (2021)	IGreport onTracking Corruption Trends (2012)	World Bank, "The Global Corruption Report: Education" (2013)	UNICEF (2013)
Teachers absenteeism rate	24%	39%	27%	Not available
Sextortion	16%	Not available	Not available	82%

Annex F. List of Sample Enumeration Areas

District Name	County_Name	Sub county Name	Parish Name	EA Name	Population
KAMPALA	KCCA	KAWEMPE DIVISION	KYEBANDO	NSOOBA 'E'	87
KAMPALA	KCCA	MAKINDYE DIVISION	KANSANGA	SSEBALALA 'B'	396
KIBOGA	KIBOGA	KIBOGA TOWN COUNCIL	BAMUSUUTA	LUFULA 'D'	121
WAKISO	BUSIRO	KATABI TOWN COUNCIL	KITALA	KITALA 'C'	489
WAKISO	KIRA MUNICIPALITY	KIRA DIVISION	KIRA	NAJJERA BUSIBANTE 'G'	181
WAKISO	NANSANA MUNICIPALITY	GOMBE DIVISION	MATUGGA	KATALEMWA 'E'	130
BUIKWE	NJERU MUNICIPALITY	NJERU DIVISION	NJERU WEST	NAMWEZI 'H'	137
LUWERO	KATIKAMU	BUTUNTUMULA	KAKABALA	NALONGO 'C'	75
MUBENDE	BUWEKULA	MADUDU	KAKENZI	KYEDIKYO	107
NAKASONGOLA	BURULI	NAKITOMA	BUJJABE	KIKOOBA	143
KAYUNGA	NTENJERU	BUSAANA	NAMUKUMA	KYAYAAYE 'B'	125
MITYANA	MITYANA	KIKANDWA	KIKUNYU	NSANGABWAMI	147
GOMBA	GOMBA	KYEGONZA	NAKIJJU	KASASA KIBOMBO	154
KYOTERA	KYOTERA	KASAALI	GAYAZA	GAYAZA A 'A'	88
BUSIA	BUSIA MUNICIPALITY	WESTERN DIVISION	NORTH A	SOLO A 'I'	119
JINJA	BUTEMBE	KAKIRA TOWN COUNCIL	WAIRAKA	WAIRAKA A 'C'	138
KAMULI	KAMULI MUNICIPALITY	SOUTHEN DIVISION	NANKULYAKU	KULINGO 'D'	70
MBALE	MBALE MUNICIPALITY	WANALE DIVISION	BOMA	NAKHUPA	93
KABERAMAIDO	KALAKI	OTUBOI	OPILITOK	KAMURIYE	87
KALIRO	BULAMOGI	KALIRO TOWN COUNCIL	BUKUMANKOOLA	BUGOMA	136
NGORA	NGORA	NGORA TOWN COUNCIL	SOUTHERN	TOWNSHIP A A	121
IGANGA	KIGULU	BULAMOGI	IWAWU	NAWANKOFU 'A'	90
KATAKWI	USUK	KATAKWI	ALELES	LALEI A	113
SOROTI	SOROTI	GWERI	AWOJA	AWOJA 'A'	93
MAYUGE	BUNYA	WAIRASA	WANDAGO	WANDAGO B 'A'	158
BUTALEJA	BUNYOLE	BUSABI	BUSABI	MALONGO 'A'	93
BUYENDE	BUDIOPE	KIDERA	BUYANJA	KASATO	139
BUTEBO	BUTEBO	BUTEBO	KASYEBAI	KATAKWI	104
APAC	APAC MUNICIPALITY	ATIK DIVISION	INDUSTRIAL	MARKET STREET 'B'	71
GULU	GULU MUNICIPALITY	PECE DIVISION	TEGWANA	AYWEE 'B'	114
LIRA	ERUTE	AGWENG	ACELELA	ANYOMENE	44
NEBBI	NEBBI MUNICIPALITY	ABINDU DIVISION	NEBBI HILL	ARUMUKENG 'B'	162
DOKOLO	DOKOLO	DOKOLO TC	EASTERN	ANYOMOLOI 'B'	66
ALEBTONG	MOROTO	ALEBTONG TOWN COUNCIL	NAKABELA	ALEBTONG WEST 'B'	55
OMORO	OMORO	OMORO TOWN COUNCIL	TE-GOT	ARWOTOMIA 'B'	122
ARUA	AYIVU	OLUKO	ANIPI	VUDRIKALI	65
KOTIDO	JIE	KACHERI	LOSAKUCHA	KOGILIGILI 'C'	62
NAKAPIRIPIRIT	CHEKWII	MORUITA	MORUITA	SUKUDIK	114

AMURU	KILAK	PABO	KAL	KAL CENTRE 'D'	293
OYAM	OYAM	LORO	ACANPII	DAGOADEK	50
KOLE	KOLE	OKWERODOT	ADELLOGO	BARPUNU	80
OMORO	OMORO	LALOGI	JAKA	LAMINONAMI 'B'	114
HOIMA	HOIMA MUNICIPALITY	BUSIISI DIVISION	KIHUKYA	KAITIRA 'A'	131
KASESE	BUSONGORA	HIMA TOWN COUNCIL	KARUNGIBATE	KINYAMWENGE	146
MBARARA	MBARARA MUNICIPALITY	KAKOBA DIVISION	KAKOBA	KISENYI A 'C'	179
NTUNGAMO	NTUNGAMO MUNICIPALITY	WESTERN DIVISION	KAHUNGA	NYABUBARE 'A'	213
IBANDA	IBANDA	IGORORA TOWN COUNCIL	IGORORA	NTUNGAMO I	69
KIRYANDONGO	KIBANDA	KIGUMBA TOWN COUNCIL	WARD C	KIHURA II 'C'	145
KAGADI	BUYAGA	MUHORRO TOWN COUNCIL	NYAMITI	KIBANGA	67
KABALE	NDORWA	BUHARA	BUHARA	KYASE A 'A'	71
KIBAALE	BUYANJA	NYAMARWA	KYAKATWANGA	KAHORO 'A'	126
NTUNGAMO	RUHAAMA	RUHAAMA	RWENGOMA	NYAKAHITA	77
KANUNGU	KINKIIZI	RUGYEYO	KATUNGU	BURORA	91
KIRUHURA	KAZO	BURUNGA	BURUNGA	KAWIRI	93
NTOROKO	NTOROKO	KANARA	KAMUGA	KAMUGA 'A'	92

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