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HOW TO CREATE AND USE ONLINE SURVEYS TO ASSESS CORRUPTION AND ANTI- CORRUPTION – FROM PROGRAMING TO EXPORT AND CLEANING OF DATA

Regional training for R2G4P members

18-20 May 2022

Implemented by:



Iceland
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Norway grants




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Instrument(s) for measurement



Theory and literature review



Operational definition(s)



Quantitative indicators



Instrument(s) for measurement



Data collection



Calculations, results




Analysis, conclusions

SELDI Corruption Monitoring System (CMS)


State Capture Assessment Diagnostics (SCAD)

Theory: SCAD Theoretical Approach




Stoyanov, A, A. Gerganov & T. Yalamov (2019) State Capture Assessment Diagnostics, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia

Theory: SCAD ESL Theoretical Approach




- Simplified model
- Focus on the Business State Capture Dimension
- Expert assessments
- Two groups of indicators


Theory: Levels and content of anticorruption policies and approaches to corruption assessment



Theory/Goal: SceMaps Integrated Tool




Quantitative indicators: indexes from the Corruption Monitoring System



Quantitative indicators: State Capture: methodology

- 0 to 100 scale



- **State Capture Pressure**
 - Assessment of state capture vulnerability
- **MACPI State Capture**
 - CSD's innovative tool
 - 50+ experts per country
 - Assessments instead of perceptions
 - Company data (Big data)
- **Aggregated indicators**
 - 3 media indicators
 - Rule of law
 - Eurobarometer

Quantitative indicators: Computation of State Capture indicators

Level one concept	Institutional enablers	Level three indicators
Level two indicators	Lack of Integrity	Activities are not transparent
		Not accountable for its actions
		No checks and balances
	Lack of Impartiality	Often serves private interests
		Would never sanction certain people/firms
		Its rules of operation are violated often
	Private Interest Bias	
	Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption Policies	Estimated External Corruption Pressure
		Estimated Pressure from Above
		Estimated Involvement in Corruption

Indicators and questions are formulated negatively in order to make interpretation of values easier – the higher the value, the more unfavorable the status of the respective capture aspect is.

Quantitative indicators: Computation of State Capture indicators

Level one concept	Business State Capture pressure	Level three indicators
Level two indicators	General monopolization pressure	Assessed overall level of monopolization of the sector
	Ineffectiveness of antimonopoly laws	Laws regulating the sector help/hinder/not related to the formation of monopolistic, oligopolistic or cartel structures
	Specific monopolization pressure	A specific company or a small number of companies win too many public tenders
		Laws provide illegitimate competitive advantage
		Selective application of control and/or sanctions
		Concentration of public funds in the sector (euro funds, direct subsidies etc.)

Indicators and questions are formulated negatively in order to make interpretation of values easier – the higher the value, the more unfavorable the status of the respective capture aspect is.


Quantitative indicators: Computation of State Capture indicators

Level two indicators	Computation:
General monopolization pressure	percentage of experts who believe there is any reason to suspect the existence of a monopoly/oligopoly/cartel in the sector.
Ineffectiveness of antimonopoly laws	percentage of experts who believe that the laws for the sector rather help the monopolization of the sector
Specific monopolization pressure	percentage of all experts who think that the sector suffers from at least one of the four specific problems: (1) a specific company or a small number of companies that win too many public tenders, (2) laws provide illegitimate competitive advantage, (3) control and/or sanctions are applied selectively which helps particular companies, and (4) a high concentration of grants and subsidies in the sector

Results: Italy, Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels


Level one concept	Level two indicators	Score
Business State Capture Pressure, Italy, Wholesale of fuels = 57%	General monopolization pressure	85%
	Ineffectiveness of antimonopoly laws	21%
	Specific monopolization pressure	60%

Results/analysis: Corruption pressure and involvement in corruption (2016)




Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2016

Results/analysis: Corruption Dynamics: Difference 2016 - 2014, %




Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016

Results/analysis: Corruption pressure in the region, % (2014 and 2016)



Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016


Results/analysis: Corruption Pressure Bulgaria 1999 - 2018




Conclusions

- Some improvement for the SEE region as a whole between 2001/2002 and 2014/2016
- Individual countries seldom show stable improvement over time.
- Decline in corruption pressure is typically followed by another increase with average levels of pressure remaining very high over a period of several years.

Analysis: Hidden Economy Indexes, Bulgaria



Analysis/Results/Quantitative indicators: Hidden Employment Index, components




Analysis:


Analysis of the results

Types of specific monopolization pressure in Construction. High procurement concentration in Bulgaria and Spain in this sector.

Types of specific monopolization pressure



- A specific company or a small number of companies win too many public tenders
- Laws provide illegitimate competitive advantage
- Control and/or sanctions are applied selectively which helps particular companies
- Concentration of grants and subsidies in the sector (euro funds, direct subsidies, etc.)



Download from:
<https://seldi.net/publications/reports/anti-corruption-reloaded-assessment-of-southeast-europe/>



METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX: CORRUPTION MONITORING SYSTEM



The Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) was designed and developed by CSD in 1998.²⁵⁴ Introduced at a time when corruption measurement was confined to public perceptions, the CMS launched a measure of the corruption victimisation of individuals by public officials accounting for their direct experience with various corruption patterns. Based on CMS diagnostics, assessments could be made about the dynamics of the prevalence of corruption patterns in a society.

The CMS methodology allows comparability of data across countries and registers the actual level and trends of direct involvement in administrative corruption, as well as the public attitudes, assessments and expectations relating to corruption. CMS diagnostics have been applied in Bulgaria since 1998,²⁵⁵ in Southeast Europe in 2001, 2002 and 2014,²⁵⁶ and occasionally in Georgia and Moldova. Some CMS concepts have also been modified and included in the Eurobarometer surveys on corruption; this makes CMS data comparable to Eurobarometer data.²⁵⁷

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Most academic and policy analyses on corruption usually start with the assertion that corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon that is difficult or impossible to measure.²⁵⁸ The measurement problem of multi-facet phenomena as corruption boils down to definition and operationalisation of the underlying concept. Defining what is being measured scopes the interpretations of data and the types of conclusions that could be made.

The CMS is one of the possible measurement approaches to corruption. Its main objective is to provide statis-

tical estimates of the prevalence of the most common incidents of corruption and has diagnostic and descriptive functions.

In the CMS context, corruption is conceptualised as a specific type of social behaviour which includes specific forms of interaction between actors, attitudes associated with these interactions and a set of perceptions which relate to the interactions (serving both as reflections of the interaction and prerequisites which define the behaviour strategy of the actors). Corruption refers to a specific group of interactions: the public is provided with services by government institutions, in the process of which it deals with officials who are employed by these institutions. Corruption is described through the "principal-agent model": members of the public (clients) interact with government institutions (principal) through officials (agents); agents act on behalf of the principal who defines their rights and obligations and entrusts them with certain discretionary power. Corruption is an interaction in which officials in government institutions (agents) abuse the discretionary power they have been entrusted with by these institutions (principal) in their interaction with the public (clients).

This definition has two key elements which need to be further operationalised: "abuse" and "benefit". Both should be present for certain behaviour to be categorised as corruption. The relation between these concepts could be defined as a "form-content" relationship. The "benefit" is the form of the transaction, while the "abuse" refers to the content of the transaction – the type of resource that is being offered in exchange for a benefit. Varieties of corruption behaviour arise because of the variation in both form and content: of the benefits that are being supplied by clients to agents and of the types of abuse of public power are the content of the exchange. The most common word used to label the forms of corruption is "bribe." Regarding content, variations in corruption behaviour could be numerous but they depend on what is being done, how it is done and who is the perpetrator. In more concrete terms the above variation in corruption behaviour could be summarised in four sub-concepts:

- **Form.** Bribe is the common label of the private benefit that is being exchanged. The most common forms



Download from:
<https://seldi.net/cms-data/cms-methodology/>

Theory and literature review



Operational definition(s)



Quantitative indicators



Instrument(s) for measurement



Data collection



Calculations, results



Analysis, conclusions

Data collection: SCAD ESL Survey



A continuación encontrará varias preguntas sobre diferentes organismos públicos, agencias estatales y órganos de control en España. Por favor, indique cómo de familiarizado está con cada uno de ellos.

(Una respuesta por cada fila)

	Muy familiari- zado	Bastante familiari- zado	Poco familiari- zado	Nada familiari- zado
Tribunales administrativos autonómicos de la contratación pública	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Agencia Valenciana Antifraude	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Agencia Española de Medicamentos y Productos Sanitarios	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Junta Consultiva de Contratación Administrativa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Comisión Interministerial de Precios de Medicamentos y Productos Sanitarios	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Agencias o institutos autonómicos de la energía (EVE, ICAEN, FENERCOM, AGENEX, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Administraciones autonómicas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

Data collection: SCAD ESL Survey

¿Diría usted que la presión externa para [participar en] transacciones relacionadas con la corrupción (como sobornos, lobby ilegítimo, tráfico de influencias, etc.) sobre los siguientes organismos es: alta, media, baja o inexistente?

(Esta presión externa significa que personas ajenas al organismo (independientemente de si son ciudadanos, miembros de otras instituciones, etc.) ofrecen sobornos y/o solicitan favores.)

Una respuesta por cada fila

	Alta presión	Presión media	Baja presión	No hay presión
Tribunales administrativos autonómicos de la contratación pública	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Agencia Valenciana Antifraude	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

¿Cómo de probable sería que un superior ordene a su personal que realizara actividades o servicios no autorizados en los siguientes organismos públicos?

Una respuesta por cada fila

	Muy probable	Bastante probable	Poco probable	Totalmente improbable
Tribunales administrativos autonómicos de la contratación pública	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Agencia Valenciana Antifraude	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway grants



Norway grants

Questions?



Practical exercise 1: data collection

Create a survey with filters

- Option 1. CMS, hidden economy: q1a & q3 to q8 from “SELDI_CMS_Master_EN.docx”
- Option 2. “Difficult survey questionnaire.docx” (advanced users)
- Option 3. Choose any questionnaire you would like

<https://agerganov.eu/limesurvey/admin>

Practical exercise 2: data checking and cleaning

SPSS

PSPP

(download from: <https://www.gnu.org/software/pspp/get.html>)

Monitoring anticorruption policy implementation (MACPI)

Monitoring Anti-Corruption in Europe. Bridging Policy Evaluation and Corruption Measurement



Download from: <https://csd.bg/publications/publication/monitoring-anti-corruption-in-europe-bridging-policy-evaluation-and-corruption-measurement/>

Stages of MACPI implementation

- First stage
 - Desk research
 - Interviews with experts from the assessed public organization;
 - Compilation of a list of the activities of and a list of the anti-corruption policies of the organization
- Second stage – an anonymous online survey among employees of the organization (MACPI Officials); random sample;
- Third stage – an anonymous survey among external experts (MACPI Experts) and a survey among clients of the organization (MACPI Clients)

Operational definition(s):

Corruption interest (potential)

Corruption interest:

the theoretical possibility for corruption, given the existing organizational setup and the combination of existing demand and supply for deliberate noncompliance (corruption associated with certain activity is feasible and happens)

Practical manifestation: existence of corruption pressure, i.e. concrete proposals to initiate a corruption transaction either by an official (agent) or a citizen (client). Two types of corruption pressure can be identified: outside pressure and inside pressure.

Quantitative indicators:

General and specific indicators for assessment of activities

General indicators	Specific indicators	Content/interpretation
Corruption interest	Existence of interest for basic types of corruption transactions	Reflects the principle interest and practical feasibility/sense of select types of corruption transactions, given the situation in the country and the organisation.
Corruption pressure	Evasion of regulations	Share of officials who gave above average score on how many individuals/companies (clients) try to circumvent the rules in this activity.
	Outside pressure associated with activity	Share of those who answered that there is some level of outside corruption pressure in this activity.
	Susceptibility to pressure from above	Share of officials who consider it likely that employees would perform illegitimate activities if ordered by a superior.
	Susceptibility to pressure from outside	Share of officials who consider it likely that employees would accept or ask for a bribe associated with activity.

Quantitative indicators: MACPI

indicators and methods

Indicators / Methods	MACPI Desk research	MACPI In- depth interview	MACPI officials /experts	MACPI Clients / CMS
Corruption interest	X	X	X	
Corruption pressure			X	X
Involvement in corruption				X
Corruption attitudes				X
Corruption reputation of sectors/ officials				X
Implementability of AC policies			X	
Implementation of AC policies			X	
Estimated effectiveness of AC policies			X	


MACPI Preparation

- ▶ The organization is invited to participate in the MACPI audit (or the organization approaches the research team) and a person is designated as the main contact who will cooperate with the MACPI expert team.
- ▶ A preliminary meeting is organized between the MACPI expert team and the management of the organization or/and the person designated by the management as a contact on behalf of the organization.
- ▶ A preliminary list of the main activities and the structure of the organization should be prepared by the expert before this meeting.
- ▶ Introducing MACPI, its steps and outputs (the technical report; analytical report)
- ▶ The list of activities prepared by the MACPI research team is discussed and edited and a draft of the list is provided to the organization for review and final approval.

Evaluation of corruption risk zones

- Desk research: establish structure of activities in organization
- Develop a matrix of activities and forms of corruption
- IDI: ask about **corruption interest** for each cell in the table of potential risk zones; ask about **cases of corruption** (whether it actually happens)
- IDI: identify anticorruption policies associated with each risk zone

Corruption risk zones in public organisations
(activities by types of corruption) and anticorruption policies



IDI methodology

- **Method and process:** The interviewed expert is presented with a draft **list of activities** of the organization and a **list of corruption types** with their respective definitions.

The interview is conducted in the following **steps**:

- 1. Review of the list of activities of the public organization.
- 2. Introduction to the surveyed types of corruption (description and eventual clarifications by interviewer).
- 3. Evaluation of the likelihood of types of corruption for each activity.
- 4. Definition of anticorruption policy (introduction and explanations provided by interviewer).
- In case the expert needs to consult colleagues and organizational documents the interview is interrupted and a second meeting is scheduled.
- 5. Identification of general anticorruption policies (address more than one activity).
- 6. Identification of specific anticorruption policies (address single activities).

Corruption risk assessment of activities

Now we will jointly review the likelihood of types of corruption to occur activity by activity. What I mean by “to occur” is that for a certain type of corruption we could say that:

- It has practical relevance/makes sense either for employees or clients of your organisation.
- Such a transaction contains a potential corruption interest – both sides would benefit by violating the law and the likelihood of being caught is low.
- Such cases have been identified in your organization.
- Given the current situation in the country (city, organization, etc.) one could not rule it out.

- Do you believe that **abuse of power** is possible/could happen or happens for this activity?
- Would you say it is very probable?
- Do clients of your organisation hint or indicate to employees that they would have an interest in such a transaction?
- What would you say is the most likely mechanism of such a transaction, if it happens?
- Have such cases been identified?
- *Interviewer goes over the table cell by cell and asks the above questions as appropriate. Marks cells of corruption vulnerability and record corruptions transaction mechanisms described by expert.*

Corruption vulnerability map (based on Border Police diagnostics)

	Abuse of power	Abuse of property	Nepotism	Clientelism
Human resources				
Procurement				
Preventive investigation				
Border security (green border)				
Investigation				
Provision of information				
Border crossing control				
Administrative and punitive activities				

MACPI In-depth interview

Zones of potential corruption interest. P = “present”

	Activity / Type of corruption interest	Abuse of Power	Abuse of Property	Nepotism	Clientelism	Conflict of interest
1.	Activity 1.	P		P	P	P
2.	Activity 2.	P	P		P	P
	P		P	P	P
N.	Activity N.	P		P	P	P

Anticorruption measures/policies

IDI introduction to AC policies/measures (1)

Anticorruption policies

- “There are some cells in the table that proved risky. We now need to draw a list of anticorruption policies that are currently implemented in your organization. Most probably you will need to consult documents and/or colleagues before we can complete this task.” Before that I would like to introduce you to the topic and explain what we actually mean by anticorruption policies.

Types of AC policies/measures:

- **General AC policies/measures:** apply to most activities in the organization
 - Asset declarations of employees;
 - Declarations for conflict of interest;
 - Anticorruption training;
 - Awareness campaigns, information days;
 - Civic control mechanisms like corruption mailboxes, web sites that collect feedback from clients, complaint procedures, etc.

List of the main activities in Border Police Bulgaria

Human resources
Green border security
Border checkpoints
Information activities
Preventive investigation
Administrative and punitive
Public procurement

List of anticorruption policies in Border Police Bulgaria

Declarations of assets and incomes
Direct superiors have to read and sign asset declarations
Immediate reactions to each signal for corrupt behaviour
Information campaigns among staff
Information campaigns among the citizens
Issuance of additional orders and instructions
Anticorruption training of personnel
Video surveillance
Rotation
Unannounced visits
Interviews with passengers and illegal immigrants
Measures for inspection and testing of job applicants

List of the main activities in Traffic Police Bulgaria

Human resources
Participation in Public Procurement committees
Traffic control
Traffic organization
Piloting and escort
Processing violations registered by automated systems
Cross-border exchange of information
Registration and technical control of vehicles
Registration and control of the drivers of motor vehicles
Specialized information exchange and cooperation with European structures
Administrative and punitive activities
Reporting and analyzing road accidents
Prevention activities

List of anticorruption policies in Traffic Police Bulgaria

Automated Information System "Traffic Police" (workstations for remote access, GPS-location, central monitoring and control)
Continuous video recording during roadside checks on persons and vehicles
Rotation
Checks on vehicles using the method of "broad control" with video recording
Technical means of speed control, equipped with fiscal memory
Automated Information System "Administrative and punitive activity"
Informing the citizens about the reasons to be denied registration and / or technical review of vehicles.
Measures for inspection and testing of job applicants

List of the main activities in Burgas Municipality

Human resources
Public procurement
Urban planning, building and control
Control activities
Management and control of the revenues
Management and control of the electronic system
Management of the municipal property
Economic services and business activities controlled by the municipality
Administrative activities and services

List of anticorruption policies in Burgas Municipality

Conflict of interest declarations
Asset declarations
Client's rights (Client's Charter) and standards for administrative services in the municipality
Ethical code of conduct for employees
Checking citizen's signals received through the different channels
Trainings on anti-corruption and conflict of interest
Participation of the municipal councillors in the municipal commissions: advertising, municipal property etc.
Video surveillance
Announcements and publicity about public procurement and the results from past tenders

Lists of activities and AC policies Examples: Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency

Activities

- ▶ Analysis prior to the initiation of actions
- ▶ Investigation
- ▶ Prevention, training and documentation
- ▶ Expertise and support to courts
- ▶ Legal affairs and sanctioning procedures
- ▶ Protection of the complainants
- ▶ ICT services
- ▶ Human resources
- ▶ Administration and economic management
- ▶ Directorate General
- ▶ Communication

AC Policies

- ▶ Requirements and procedure for the election of the director.
- ▶ The Governing Board replaces the Director of the Agency as the decision-making body in legal cases of his or her abstention or recusal.
- ▶ Obligation of confidentiality and duty of secrecy.
- ▶ Annual income and asset declaration for management staff.
- ▶ Technical capacity and professional skills training actions.
- ▶ External auditing by the Audit Office of the Valencian region and by the Valencian Parliament
- ▶ Recruitment in the agency is reserved for civil servants.
- ▶ "Special service" status of the public employee when joining the Agency.
- ▶ Authorization procedure to allow compatibility with any [external] activities that do not entail a conflict of interest
- ▶ Information security policy
- ▶ Electronic document management policy
- ▶ Anonymous complaints mailbox

Lists of activities and AC policies Examples: National Revenue Agency, Bulgaria

Activities

- ▶ Human resources
- ▶ Control over the construction documents
- ▶ Control over the construction
- ▶ Control over the use of buildings
- ▶ Commissioning of constructions of first, second and third category.
- ▶ Removal of illegal constructions.
- ▶ Representation of the DNCC in court

AC Policies

- ▶ Rules for receiving and reporting corruption signals
- ▶ Mailbox for signals related to corruption and anonymous polls
- ▶ Code of Ethics
- ▶ Rotation of legal advisers when legal representation is needed
- ▶ Control over asset declarations
- ▶ Department of Internal-Regional Control at DNCC exercises control over the activities of the Regional DNCC
- ▶ Internal rules for hiring new employees
- ▶ Internal procedure in case of receiving complaints against the regional DNCC
- ▶ On-site inspections
- ▶ Carrying out inspections on a sample basis or when receiving a signal
- ▶ Procedures regulating the activities of DNCC and the Regional DNCC
- ▶ Procedures related to transparency

Results: Corruption vulnerability of activities (Border Police, Bulgaria)

Activities	Corruption interest	Corruption pressure			
	Theoretical possibility of corruption (0 - 100%)	Evasion of regulations (0 - 100%)	Outside pressure (0 - 100%)	Susceptibility to pressure form above (0 - 100%)	Susceptibility to pressure form outside (0 - 100%)
Administrative and punitive	75	33,3	53,8	19,2	23,1
Public procurement	75	30	55,2	27,6	20,7

Results: Anticorruption measures/policies and organizational activities

Table 2. Corruption vulnerability zones and anticorruption policies*

Activities	Anticorruption policies											
	Specific					General						
	1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Human resources					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Procurement						X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Preventive investigation			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Border security (green border)	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Investigation				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Provision of information				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Border check-point control		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Administrative and punitive activities				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X

* As identified in the Bulgarian Border Police.

Results:

Border checkpoints

	Indicator	Value	Reference value (ideal)
Corruption interest	Abuse of power	Present	Absent
	Abuse of property	Absent	Absent
	Nepotism	Absent	Absent
	Clientelism	Present	Absent
Corruption pressure	Evasion of regulations	20.8%	5-10
	Outside pressure associated with activity	40.7%	5-10
	Susceptibility to pressure from above	6.5%	5
	Susceptibility to pressure from outside	15.3%	5
Coverage by anticorruption policies	Anticorruption measures targeting the activity	Estimated effectiveness of measure	Reference value (ideal)
	Video surveillance	92.2%	80
	Immediate reaction to each corruption complaint	89.1%	80
	Unannounced visits	87.0%	80
	Information campaigns for the public	86.1%	80
	Anticorruption training at the Police Academy	85.7%	80
	Information campaigns among staff	81.8%	80
	Interviews with passengers and illegal immigrants	80.2%	80
	Rotation	78.8%	80
	Additional orders and instructions	77.7%	80
	Direct superiors read and sign asset declarations	68.7%	80
	Declarations of assets and income	66.5%	80

Calculations, results: Computation of MACPI Indicators, Activities

III. (Actual) Corruption pressure	% of people who answered that at least in some cases they were offered (directly or indirectly) a bribe or were threatened during the last year.
IV. Estimated Corruption pressure	
1. Outside pressure associated with activity	% of people who answered that there is some level of pressure (high, medium or low)
2. Susceptibility to pressure from above	% of people who answered with very/rather likely pressure from above
3. Susceptibility to pressure from outside	% of people who answered that staff members are likely to accept (or ask for) a bribe
4. Avoidance of regulations	% of people who answered citizens/companies are likely to try to evade the rules

Calculations, results: Computation of MACPI

Indicators, Activities, alternative scale

III. (Actual) Corruption pressure	Actual corruption pressure for this activity (% of respondents having actual experiences with this activity who were offered a bribe during the year preceding the survey)
IV. Estimated Corruption pressure	
1. Outside pressure associated with activity	Outside pressure associated with activity (external pressure for bribes: on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is no pressure at all, 4 is high pressure)
2. Susceptibility to pressure from above	Susceptibility to pressure from outside (how likely are employees involved with this activity to accept bribes: scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not likely at all, 4 is very likely)
3. Susceptibility to pressure from outside	Pressure from above likelihood (how likely is be for a superior to order his staff members to perform unauthorized activities: scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not likely at all, 4 is very likely)
4. Avoidance of regulations	Evasion of regulations (how likely are citizens or companies to try to evade the existing rules: scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not likely at all, 4 is very likely)

Calculations, results: Computation of MACPI Indicators, Policies

Implementability	Ease of implementation (scale from 1 - “impossible to apply” to 4 – “very easily applicable”)
	Difficult to evade (scale from 1 – “it is very easy to evade” to 4 – “it is very difficult to evade”)
Implementation	Awareness (scale from 1 – “completely disagree” to 5 – “completely agree” that “this policy/ policy tool is well-known to the employees whom it concerns”)
	Strict implementation (scale from 1 – “completely disagree” to 5 – “completely agree” that “this policy/ policy tool is applied strictly”)
	Strict control (scale from 1 – “completely disagree” to 5 – “completely agree” that “there is strict control for the enforcement of this policy”)
Effectiveness	Estimated potential effectiveness (scale from 1 – “the number of corruption cases would remain the same, regardless of the implementation of the policy /policy tool” to 3 – “yes, it could greatly reduce them”)
	Estimated actual effectiveness (scale from 1 – “the corruption risk remains the same as without these measures” to 3 – “reduces the corruption risk a lot”)
	Practical effectiveness (scale from 1 – “the number of corruption cases will remain the same, if this policy/policy tool is gone” to 3 – “the number of corruption cases will increase a lot, if this policy/policy tool is gone”)

Calculations, results: MACPI Technical Report

Activity 1	Indicator	All employees familiar with this activity	Experts	Clients	Employees with management functions	Employees without management functions	Rank (1-10) Empl	Rank (1-10) Exp
Corruption interest (risk recognized by the management)	Abuse of power	Present	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Abuse of property	Absent	-	-	-	-		
	Nepotism	Present	-	-	-	-		
	Clientelism	Present	-	-	-	-		
Number of respondents	Number of respondents answering the questions							
Actual corruption pressure (experience based)	Actual corruption pressure for this activity (% of respondents having actual experiences with this activity who were offered a bribe during the year preceding the survey)							
Estimated corruption pressure (assessment based)	Outside pressure associated with activity (external pressure for bribes: on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is no pressure at all, 4 is high pressure)							
	Susceptibility to pressure from outside (how likely are employees involved with this activity to accept bribes: scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not likely at all, 4 is very likely)							
	Pressure from above likelihood (how likely is be for a superior to order his staff members to perform unauthorized activities: scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not likely at all, 4 is very likely)							
	Evasion of regulations (how likely are citizens or companies to try to evade the existing rules: scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is not likely at all, 4 is very likely)							

Calculations, results: MACPI Technical Report

Anticorruption policy coverage	Anticorruption policies relevant for this activity (% employees who indicated that the policy/measure is applicable to this activity)	Coverage	Coverage (categories)
	3. Policy 3	>70%	Good
	12. Policy 12	>70%	Good
	11. Policy 11	>70%	Good
	10. Policy 10	>70%	Good
	9. Policy 9	>70%	Good
	5. Policy 5	>70%	Good
	7. Policy 7	>70%	Good
	8. Policy 8	40-70%	Average
	2. Policy 2	40-70%	Average
	6. Policy 6	<40%	Low
	4. Policy 4	<40%	Low
	1. Policy 1	<40%	Low

Calculations, results: MACPI Technical Report

Policy 1	Indicator	All employees familiar with this activity	Experts	Employees with management functions	Employees without management functions	Rank (1-10) Empl	Rank (1-10) Exp
Number of respondents	Number of respondents answering the questions						
Implementability	Ease of implementation (scale from 1 - "impossible to apply" to 4 - "very easily applicable")						
	Difficult to evade (scale from 1 - "it is very easy to evade" to 4 - "it is very difficult to evade")						
Implementation	Awareness (scale from 1 - "completely disagree" to 5 - "completely agree" that "this policy/ policy tool is well-known to the employees whom it concerns")						
	Strict implementation (scale from 1 - "completely disagree" to 5 - "completely agree" that "this policy/ policy tool is applied strictly")						
	Strict control (scale from 1 - "completely disagree" to 5 - "completely agree" that "there is strict control for the enforcement of this policy")						
Effectiveness	Estimated potential effectiveness (scale from 1 - "the number of corruption cases would remain the same, regardless of the implementation of the policy /policy tool" to 3 - "yes, it could greatly reduce them")						
	Estimated actual effectiveness (scale from 1 - "the corruption risk remains the same as without these measures" to 3 - "reduces the corruption risk a lot")						
	Practical effectiveness (scale from 1 - "the number of corruption cases will remain the same, if this policy/policy tool is gone" to 3 - "the number of corruption cases will increase a lot, if this policy/policy tool is gone")						


SceMaps: Methodological Toolkit

State Capture Assessment on Sectoral Level Methodological Toolkit

<https://csd.bg/publications/publication/state-capture-assessment-on-sectoral-level/>



MACPI diagnostics cycle



Analysis:

MACPI Analyses

- ▶ **Ranking** the anticorruption policies in terms of implementability, implementation, and effectiveness and ranking the activities in terms of corruption pressure.
- ▶ **Vulnerability zones:** analyzing corruption pressure for the different activities of the organization and finding gaps in the AC policies coverage
- ▶ **Discrepancies analysis:** comparisons between different groups – employees with and without management functions, external experts, clients.
- ▶ Assessment of possible **systematic deviations/discrepancies** compromising the whole anticorruption setup in the organization


Analysis:

MACPI Analyses: long term monitoring

- Dynamics of actual and estimated corruption pressure
- Effects of the changes in the anti-corruption policies setup on actual and estimated corruption pressure


Analysis:

Corruption pressure trend in time (requires repeated MACPI assessments)



Analysis: Institutional level corruption and anti-corruption scan (MACPI Institutions)

Reported by officials in the scanned public organizations



Analysis: Actual corruption pressure and coverage with anticorruption policies for different activities


Policies/ Activities Bulgarian Ministry of Defence	Activity 1	Activity 2	Activity 3	Activity 4	Activity 5	Activity 6	Activity 7	Activity 8	Activity 9	Activity 10
Actual corruption pressure	27%	13%	20%	29%	17%	17%	17%	19%	26%	16%
AC Policy 1	14%	83%	58%	15%	15%	48%	17%	25%	17%	23%
AC Policy 2	7%	92%	65%	17%	27%	45%	19%	35%	16%	34%
AC Policy 3	32%	79%	59%	25%	43%	49%	24%	46%	29%	50%
AC Policy 4	8%	85%	55%	14%	52%	46%	17%	32%	43%	31%
AC Policy 5	50%	61%	42%	35%	39%	44%	38%	48%	41%	53%
AC Policy 6	56%	70%	56%	36%	40%	57%	42%	55%	40%	58%
AC Policy 7	85%	13%	9%	9%	10%	11%	62%	7%	6%	27%
AC Policy 8	62%	54%	41%	16%	25%	22%	79%	29%	22%	42%
AC Policy 9	60%	82%	62%	40%	53%	60%	48%	58%	49%	53%
AC Policy 10	4%	92%	50%	16%	15%	39%	16%	28%	15%	28%
AC Policy 11	5%	86%	35%	18%	9%	35%	18%	24%	9%	14%

Analysis:

Actual corruption pressure and coverage with anticorruption policies for different activities

Policies/ Activities Bulgarian Ministry of Defence	Public procurement	Preparation of tenders and specifications, participation in procurement and contracting, issuing licenses and certificates of quality
Actual corruption pressure	13%	20%
AC Policy 1	83%	58%
AC Policy 2	92%	65%
AC Policy 3	79%	59%
AC Policy 4	85%	55%
AC Policy 5	61%	42%
AC Policy 6	70%	56%
AC Policy 7	13%	9%
AC Policy 8	54%	41%
AC Policy 9	82%	62%
AC Policy 10	92%	50%
AC Policy 11	86%	35%

Assessment of anticorruption policies




Results: AC policy assessment in Bulgarian Border Police

AC policies	Implementation			
	Formal compliance		Real compliance	
Bulgarian Border Police	Awareness (%)	Strict implementation (%)	Strict control (%)	Strict application of sanctions (%)
Declarations of assets and incomes	94	91	63	59
Direct superiors have to read and sign asset declarations	91	89	60	51
Immediate reactions to each signal for corrupt behaviour	94	87	62	64
Information campaigns among staff	91	82	50	45
Information campaigns among the citizens	93	79	51	44
Issuance of additional orders and instructions	90	77	49	49
Anticorruption training of personnel	90	81	48	51
Video surveillance	89	88	50	56
Rotation	93	89	54	50
Unannounced visits	91	86	55	50
Interviews with passengers and illegal immigrants	91	83	52	47
Measures for inspection and testing of job applicants	88	79	44	47

Analysis:

Estimated corruption pressure (activities)


Average estimated corruption pressure for the different activities (Bulgarian Border Police)



Analysis:


Discrepancies analysis Susceptibility to pressure from outside

Susceptibility to pressure from outside (0 - 100%) for different activities: Bulgarian Border Police 2015



Analysis:

Discrepancies analysis Susceptibility to pressure from outside





Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway grants



Norway grants

Questions?



Iceland
Liechtenstein
Norway grants



Norway
grants

Thank you!

