

# An overview of procurement integrity and introduction to opentender.eu

## Session 1. Conceptual background

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Implemented by:



**SELDI.net**  
Southeast European Leadership for  
Development and Integrity



**GTI**

The R2G4P project, coordinated by the Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria benefits from a € 1.5 million grant from Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through the EEA and Norway Grants Fund for Regional Cooperation. The aim of the project is to implement shared anti-corruption and good governance solutions in Southeast Europe through innovative practices and public-private partnerships.

# Overview of the 4 sessions ahead


1. Conceptual background of procurement integrity
  - ▶ Introduction to public procurement corruption schemes
  - ▶ Conceptualising risks and definitions
2. Procurement data: sources, possible errors, and data availability:
  - ▶ Introduction to public procurement data and data gaps in globally and in the Western Balkans
  - ▶ Examples of datasets to use for analysis in the project
3. Introduction to procurement integrity indicators
  - ▶ Overview of valid and reliable corruption risk indicators in public procurement
  - ▶ Introduction to how to create and validate quantitative corruption risk indicators
4. Applications: Real life examples and introduction to opentender.eu
  - ▶ Selected applications of quantitative corruption risk analysis in public procurement from around the globe



# Agenda for Session 1

1. Why do risk assessment in public procurement?
2. Understanding the procurement process and its risks
3. Examples of risky situations and their impacts
4. Regional trends
5. Q&A


→ The style is interactive so please feel free to interject!



# I. Why do risk assessment?

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# Diverse uses of procurement data analytics

## 1. Supporting investigations on the contract/organisation/market levels:

- ▶ Initiation (e.g. flagging new cases to investigate)
  - ▶ Selection (e.g. ranking known cases)
  - ▶ Conduct (e.g. exploring selected cases)
- proxy & exact indicators alike


## 2. Supporting policy reform and policy evaluation:

- ▶ Systemic (e.g. data system)
- ▶ Regulatory (e.g. procedural thresholds)
- ▶ Organisational (e.g. setting different accountability rules)

## II. The procurement process and its risks


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# Corruption measurement steps

1. Specific definition of corruption
2. Identify target population and sample
3. Dictionary of corruption *technologies*
4. Tailoring and validation



# Corruption definition

„public corruption is the abuse of entrusted public authority for undue private interest.” (Nye 1967: 417).

- ▶ Universal interest is enshrined
- ▶ Deliberate deviation from norm is sanctioned
- ▶ There is social loss






# Specific corruption definition

In public procurement, the aim of corruption is to **steer the contract to the favored bidder without detection**. This is done in a number of ways, including:

- ▶ ***Avoiding competition*** through, e.g., unjustified sole sourcing or direct contract awards.
- ▶ ***Favoring a certain bidder*** by tailoring specifications, sharing inside information, etc.

*See: World Bank Integrity Presidency (2009) Fraud and Corruption. Awareness Handbook, World Bank, Washington DC. pp. 7.*




# Definition in detail

- ▶ What it is NOT:
  - ▶ Not necessarily bribery
  - ▶ Not only „abuse of public office for private gain”
- ▶ What it IS:
  - ▶ Corruption=particularism and restricted access
  - ▶ Institutionalised=recurrent, stable, systemic
  - ▶ Grand=high-level politics and business
- ▶ Sources:
  - ▶ Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment. *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3), 86–99.
  - ▶ Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. *Governance*, 21(2), 165–190.
  - ▶ North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). *Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
  - ▶ Kaufmann, D., & Vicente, P. C. (2005). *Legal Corruption*. World Bank
  - ▶ Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007). *The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform. Theory, Evidence and Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge



# What can be corrupted in procurement?

Figure 1: Stages of the procurement process at which corruption can occur and modes of political influence over process




Source: Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth & Fazekas, Mihály, (2016). Corrupt Contracting: Partisan Favouritism in Public Procurement. ERCAS Working Paper No. 49, Berlin: Hertie School of Governance.

# The public procurement process: target population




Let's gather together what happens at each of these stages!

→ Much more on data in a few minutes...



# Introduction



Misconduct generally occurs at the critical decision points in the procurement process



Adapted from IMPPM 2017-Uni Roma Tor Vergata. Integrity module (Agerskov, Fazekas, Piga)




**A typical scheme** Bribes tend to go up in the ministry, and can continue through contract implementation





# III. Identifying corrupt schemes: selected examples



# Advertisement: Your expert assessment

- Road reconstruction between two medium-sized cities,
- 25 km two-lane road,
- delivery in the summer


advertisement period	vote count
3 calendar days including weekend	
6 calendar days including Christmas holidays and weekend	
18 calendar days including 2 weekends	
40 calendar days	
60 calendar days	





# Advertisement

- ▶ What could be the red flag in this case?



# Threat: Biased specifications

## What is it?

Drafting a technical solution or detailed specifications that deliberately exclude other valid options.

## What are some examples?

Any example will depend on the type of good, work or service being procured, e.g.:

- Pickup truck with 6-cyl and 3.2l engine.
- Blood gas analyzers with an OLED-screen for readouts.
- Cement highway (when an asphalt is more economical).
- Mosquito nets with no maximum gap size (only minimum!)



Adapted from IMPPM 2017-Uni Roma Tor Vergata. Integrity module (Agerskov, Fazekas, Piga)



# Threat Shell company

## What is it?


A company that exists on paper only, i.e., it has no activities and staff except for a formal manager and owner. Related is fictitious companies that are not even formally registered. While shell companies are used in, e.g., corporate restructuring, they have no place in procurement.

## What are some examples?

- Shell company owned by Finance Minister's son wins contracts, takes a cut, and subcontracts all work.
- The contractor is entirely fictitious – it cannot be found on any of the addresses listed.



Adapted from IMPPM 2017-Uni Roma Tor Vergata. Integrity module (Agerskov, Fazekas, Piga)





# Threat Bogus subcontracting


## What is it?

The work is subcontracted to a company which is not able to do the work, instead it is used to siphon off funds

## What are some examples?

See on the right→

## Office of a subcontractor



ФИСКАЛНА СМЕТКА  
№0003  
КАРГОС-ПРОМ Д.О.О.Е.П.  
11-ТИ СЕПТЕМВРИ БР. 58  
КИЧЕВО  
ДАН.БРОЈ: 4012993105000  
ДДВ БРОЈ: МК4012993105000

ДЈУС 0.25	2,000 x 40,00	80,00 А
КАФЕ ЕСПРЕСО	2,000 x 20,00	40,00 А
ВКУПЕН ПРОМЕТ		120,00
ВКУПНО ДДВ А=18,00%		18,50
ВКУПНО ДДВ		18,50
ПРОМЕТ ОД МАКЕДОНСКИ ПР.		0,00
ВКУПНО ГОТОВО		120,00
0014052		2 АРТИКЛИ



# Threat Bid steering

## What is it?

Manipulation of the procurement procedures to steer a contract to a favored company by excluding other qualified vendors.

## What are some examples?

- The tender notice is unnecessarily **vague** so that bidders cannot determine their interest (and, hence, do not bid).
- A Request for Proposal is posted over a holiday period with an unreasonably short **deadline** (often shorter than required by the World Bank or national rules).
- Pages from a bid have been torn out or the entire bid left in the **safe**, resulting in the bid being declared unresponsive or not considered.
- **Price** of the lowest responsive bidder has been altered during or after bid opening.
- Bid Evaluation Committee members disqualify a bidder for minor deviations or give a biased **scoring**.



Adapted from IMPPM 2017-Uni Roma Tor Vergata. Integrity module (Agerskov, Fazekas, Piga)





# Threat Substandard work

## What is it?


Goods, works, and services that do not comply with the specifications stipulated in the contract. This may be in agreement with corrupt officials or the result of a company taking advantage of poor contract management practices. Sometimes supervision consultants are bribed or coerced to sign-off on substandard work. Substandard work typically becomes fraudulent, when the contractor recklessly or knowingly claim to have performed the work required in order to obtain payment.

## What are some examples?

- Instead of German equipment, the contractor supplier a Chinese brand – the government didn't know and didn't check.
- Contractor abandoned the construction site without finishing the work.
- Computers were supplied with less memory than required.



Adapted from IMPPM 2017-Uni Roma Tor Vergata. Integrity module (Agerskov, Fazekas, Piga)







## IV. Regional trends

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
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# EuroPAM public procurement legislative scores, Western Balkans, Turkey and EU average (2020)




Source: Fazekas et al (2021) Corruption Risks in Public Procurement in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Council of Europe. In press





# Accessibility and usability of standard data fields



Source: Fazekas et al (2021) Corruption Risks in Public Procurement in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Council of Europe. In press



# Public procurement performance indicators (2018) (OECD)


	AL	BiH	KV	NMK	SRB	Western Balkans	EU
Number of contracts awarded by competitive procedure (%)	84	97	92	98	91	94	74
Number of competitive procedures awarded by acquisition price only (%)	82	26	99	98	89	94	40
Average number of tender per competitive procedure	3	2.4	5	3	2.5	3	4.3

Source: Fazekas et al (2021) Corruption Risks in Public Procurement in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Council of Europe. In press





Looking forward to the discussion!



# Further resources

<http://www.govtransparency.eu/>

<http://redflags.govtransparency.eu/>

[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mihaly\\_Fazekas/research](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mihaly_Fazekas/research)



# Selected further readings

- Fazekas, M., & Kocsis, G. (2020). [Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Government Contracting Data](#). British Journal of Political Science.
- Bauhr, Monika ; Czibik, Ágnes ; Fine Licht, Jenny ; Fazekas, Mihály. (2019) "[Lights on the Shadows of Public Procurement: Transparency as an Antidote to Corruption](#)." *Governance (Oxford)* 33.3: 495-523.
- Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth & Fazekas, Mihály (2019), [Grand corruption and government change: an analysis of partisan favoritism in public procurement](#). European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research.
- Fazekas, Mihály, (2019) [Single bidding and non-competitive tendering procedures in EU Co-funded Projects](#). European Commission, Brussels.
- Fazekas, Mihály, Ugale, Gavin, and Zhao, Angelina, (2019) [Analytics for Integrity. Data-Driven Approaches for Enhancing Corruption and Fraud Risk Assessments](#). OECD, Paris.
- Fazekas, Mihály ; King, Lawrence Peter. (2018) "[Perils of Development Funding? The Tale of EU Funds and Grand Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe](#)." *Regulation & Governance* 13.3: 405-30.
- Fazekas, Mihály ; Tóth, Bence. (2018) "[The Extent and Cost of Corruption in Transport Infrastructure. New Evidence from Europe](#)." *Transportation Research. Part A, Policy and Practice* 113: 35-54.
- Fazekas, M., Cingolani, L., & Tóth, B. (2016). [A comprehensive review of objective corruption proxies in public procurement: risky actors, transactions, and vehicles of rent extraction](#): GTI-WP/2016:03. Government Transparency Institute. Budapest.

